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The Riddle of Ruth Bryan Owen
Daniel B. Rice*
INTRODUCTION
Her ancestors helped win America's independence.' As a child, she
watched House debates with rapt attention, vowing eventually to return to
her beloved Capitol building. She gazed out on millions of cheering faces
during her father's three presidential campaigns. Her uncle was a governor
and vice-presidential nominee, her father the American Secretary of State.
She ran the American Women's War Relief Fund alongside future First
Lady Lou Hoover and nursed dying Allied soldiers. After establishing
herself as Florida's leading female activist, she campaigned for the House
of Representatives in 1928, promising to send her district's most
exemplary young citizens to Washington on an unparalleled civic
pilgrimage. She won resoundingly-making her the first woman the South
ever sent to Congress-even though her home state hadn't yet ratified the
Nineteenth Amendment.2 She later served as our nation's first female
ambassador. Who was more American than Ruth Bryan Owen?
But just as this dazzling stateswoman-to-be prepared to take her seat in
Congress, her defeated opponent challenged her eligibility to participate in
the federal lawmaking process. For only the second time since 1789,3 a
losing House candidate impugned his opponent's qualifications on
citizenship grounds, arguing that Owen hadn't "been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States" as the Constitution requires.4 How could
Owen have possibly been vulnerable on this score?
Under the Expatriation Act of 1907, American women (but not men)
who married foreigners were automatically stripped of their American
* Law clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2015.
Thanks to William Baude, Joseph Blocher, Josh Chafetz, Marin Levy, Bill O'Connell, Stephen Sachs,
Lawrence Solum, Gregg Strauss, and especially Kyle Druding for their generous comments.
1. For these and other biographical details, see infra Part II and Conclusion.
2. Florida finally ratified the Amendment in 1969. LEE WILLIS, SOUTHERN PROHIBITION: RACE,
REFORM, AND PUBLIC LIFE IN MIDDLE FLORIDA, 1821-1920, at 157 (2011).
3. See CHESTER H. ROWELL, A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DIGEST OF ALL THE CONTESTED
ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE FIRST TO
THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, 1789-1901, at 37-38 (1901) (examining David Ramsay's failed challenge
to William Smith's eligibility to serve in the First Congress); id. at 426 (discussing Lowry v. White, a
House case from the 1880s, in which a foreign-born candidate failed to produce his naturalization
certificate).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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citizenship.' Owen found true love in 1910, but her husband happened to
be a subject of Edward VII of England. The Nineteenth Amendment's
egalitarian ethos rendered this discriminatory regime perverse and
archaic; 6 after Congress passed the Cable Act in 1922, no American
woman lost her citizenship simply by reason of marriage.' But the Cable
Act's justice wasn't retroactive; Owen had to undergo naturalization, even
as she guided fellow aliens through the acculturation process. Finally, in
1925, her busy schedule allowed her to become naturalized on the federal
judiciary's timetable. By 1928, Owen had been a U.S. citizen for at least
twenty-eight years of her storied life. Wasn't this good enough?
William Lawson, Owen's challenger, argued that the period of "seven
years" spelled out in the Constitution refers to the seven immediately
preceding years as a consecutive unit.' On this theory, the House
Qualifications Clause regarded Owen as an American citizen only from
the moment in 1925 when she became one by choice. Owen had therefore
"been" a U.S. citizen for only three years when elected to Congress, and
the House could not legitimately seat her.
Owen publicly regarded Lawson's challenge as a "joke" and an
"absurdity ... not worth taking seriously."9 When House Elections
Committee No. 1 took her contest as seriously as all others, Owen rose to
her own defense. She naturally replied that seven cumulative years of
citizenship suffice.o But more importantly, Owen welcomed this
controversy as a teaching opportunity-she desired "to make more clear
the laws which have dealt unjustly with women."" Accordingly, Owen
stressed Section 4 of the Cable Act, which allowed any marital expatriate
who later became naturalized to "have the same citizenship status as if her
marriage had taken place after the passage of [the Cable Act]"-that is,
that she had effectively never "cease[d] to be a citizen. "12 Congress had
wiped away the old law and removed the "stain it once had placed on our
citizenship record." 3 Her involuntary expatriation was but a bad dream.
The Elections Committee issued a ten-page report in March 1930,
unanimously resolving that Owen retain her seat. 14 But the report's
concluding resolutions masked deep interpretive disagreements. Five of
5. See Expatriation Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
6. See, e.g., infra notes 577-582 and accompanying text.
7. Unless she married an alien racially ineligible to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. See Cable
Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-345, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922).
8. Lawson's argument is recounted in Part III.B.4.a infra.
9. Attack on Citizenship Taken as a "Joke" by Mrs. Ruth Bryan Owen, EVE. INDEP. (St.
Petersburg), Nov. 30, 1928, at 11 [hereinafter Attack on Citizenship].
10. Owen's argument is recounted in Part III.B.4.b infra.
11. Contested Election Case of William C. Lawson v. Ruth Bryan Owen. Arguments and Hearings
Before Elections Comm. No. 1, House of Reps., 71st Cong. 59 (1930) (statement of Rep. Owen)
[hereinafter Owen Hearing].
12. Cable Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-325, ch. 411, §§ 3-4, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922).
13. Attack on Citizenship, supra note 9.
14. For a detailed analysis of the Committee's fascinating report, see infra Section I1I.B.6.
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the Committee's nine members endorsed Owen's "cumulative" reading of
the citizenship requirement, seemingly unaware that it would permit aliens
to serve in Congress if they had been U.S. citizens for any seven years of
their lives. The minority instead concluded that only seven immediately
preceding years of citizenship suffice. Nonetheless, it found that Section 4
utterly erased Owen's denaturalization, so she had "been" a U.S. citizen
since her birth in 1885. The full House failed to adopt either
interpretation-it simply seated Owen by voice vote.15
Key participants repeatedly insisted that Owen's case was
unprecedented. 16 Yet the Senate had confronted a remarkably similar
conundrum in 1870, when Democrats protested the seating of Hiram
Revels, the nation's first African-American senator-elect. The infamous
Dred Scott" decision had come down in 1857; the Fourteenth
Amendment-which said nothing about retroactivity-was ratified only in
1868. So Revels had been a citizen for only two years, they argued, seven
short of the required nine. Senate Republicans seated Revels anyway,
refusing Dred Scott any role in the transformative arithmetic of post-
Appomattox Senate qualifications.' 8
Professor Richard Primus rescued the Revels episode from obscurity in
a 2006 law-review article, The Riddle of Hiram Revels. 19 Primus lamented
that "[m]odern constitutional law has entirely forgotten the Revels debate.
It is not covered in textbooks, not written about in law reviews, not
discussed by law professors, and not cited by judges. In short, it is wholly
absent from our constitutional discourse." 20 He therefore sought to
"recove[r] Revels for our collective stock of constitutional knowledge."21
The legal academy's neglect of Owen's historic victory also "marks a
tremendous act of collective forgetting." 22 Only two law-review articles
since the 1930s have as much as mentioned the dispute over Owen's
citizenship, both in footnotes.23 A few modem historians have discussed
the episode, but these cursory treatments either round out biographical
sketches or briefly situate the contest within the broader campaign for
15. For a fuller account of this session, see infra Section III.B.7.
16. See infra notes 247 and 473-476 and accompanying text.
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
18. The Revels episode is chronicled in Section IV.B infra.
19. See generally Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1680
(2006).
20. Id. at 1683.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 448 n.198 (2005) ("In 1928, Ruth Bryan
Owen's election to Congress was challenged by her opponent on the grounds that she had not met the
constitutional requirement of seven years of citizenship."); Paul E. Salamanca & James E. Keller, The
Legislative Privilege To Judge the Qualifications, Elections, and Returns of Members, 95 KY. L.J.
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women's independent citizenship.24 This first full-length treatment of
Lawson v. Owen examines a hidden treasure of constitutional history and a
forgotten chapter of congressional constitutional interpretation. Owen's
struggle cries out to be "recover[ed] ... for our collective stock of
constitutional knowledge." 25
Part I sorts through the applicable law in an effort to demystify the
House's odd adjudicatory predicament. Part II summarizes key features of
Owen's remarkable biography. Her personal history and character traits-
especially her unassailable patriotism-raised absolutely none of the
Qualifications Clause's and Expatriation Act's core exclusionary
concerns. It is difficult to imagine a set of human facts more conducive to
result-oriented constitutional reasoning.26 Aware that Owen's ouster
would be intolerable, the Elections Committee studied her case for months
and strained to articulate a principled rule of decision.
Part III tells the story of Lawson's failed effort to unseat Owen. Because
every development garnered nationwide newspaper coverage, I rely
heavily on contemporaneous accounts. This long-unpublished
commentary yields fascinating insights into popular understandings of
women's constitutional equality. And because Owen's eligibility was a
contested electoral issue, this background context offers a glimpse into a
political campaign preoccupied with mass constitutional persuasion. Part
III then chronicles Owen's celebrated self-advocacy and parses the
Elections Committee report's curious constitutional reasoning.
Part IV puzzles over the participants' complete ignorance of applicable
historical lessons. In 1845, as Congress considered annexing the Republic
of Texas for immediate admission to statehood, its members sparred over
whether a Texas so received could instantly be entitled to full
representation in the House and Senate. This potentially hinged on
whether the Qualifications Clauses refer to the immediately preceding
seven or nine years, or any past seven or nine years. Clever annexationists
sidestepped the obvious difficulty and secured Texas's admission.
Congress soon welcomed six Texans who had recently helped govern a
foreign country. Had Owen known these details, she might have fortified
her forward-looking appeal with a potent argument from historical
practice.
24. See, e.g., CANDICE BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 170 (1998) (offering a four-sentence overview of the "unfortunate but
propitious incident"); Jo FREEMAN, WE WILL BE HEARD: WOMEN'S STRUGGLES FOR POLITICAL
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 109 (2008) (briefly describing Owen's political and constitutional
victories); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 66 (2011) (devoting one paragraph to Lawson's challenge); J.
STANLEY LEMONS, THE WOMAN CITIZEN: SOCIAL FEMINISM IN THE 1920S, at 235-36 (1973)
(devoting two).
25. Primus, supra note 19, at 1683.
26. To echo Chief Justice Marshall, if these congressmen-jurists had been "permitted to indulge
their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them c[ould] scarcely be imagined." Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
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The Revels affair seems to cut the other way, however. Republicans
could have buttressed their depictions of "grand, tectonic constitutional
shifts" with a "technical point[] of law" 27 -the free-born Revels had been
a citizen from birth until well beyond his ninth birthday,28 and that was
enough. But not one senator made this argument. Lawson might have
seized upon this apparent institutional waiver of the "cumulative" view in
exhorting the House to reason as the Senate once did. Or Owen might
have instructed the House to entirely ignore the loathsome expatriation
law in computing her eligibility, just as most Senate Republicans had with
Dred Scott. Instead, everyone played John Marshall29 and argued from
scratch.
Part V closes with three practical meditations on Lawson v. Owen. First,
that controversy invited serious reflection on the present status of gender-
discriminatory laws in a post-Nineteenth Amendment world. Participants
and intrigued observers all seemed to agree that the Expatriation Act of
1907 was now unconstitutional, and Congress was right to repeal it
posthaste. That day's legal cognoscenti-unlike the modern Supreme
Court-understood the Nineteenth Amendment as something more than a
rule of equality in governments' allocation of voting privileges.3 0 This
Article presents considerable new evidence that the Nineteenth
Amendment's contemporaries came to regard women as improper objects
of state-sanctioned discrimination soon after that Amendment's
ratification.31 In short, Owen's triumph marks an important turning point
in American women's effort to achieve full constitutional equality. But
because scholars have largely forgotten her story, they have overlooked
crucial sources that might have helped provide a historically firmer basis
for modern sex-discrimination doctrine.
Second, Owen's case yields fresh insight into one of the most hotly
debated questions in modern constitutional and statutory interpretation:
whether ostensibly clear legal texts can be validly deemed ambiguous after
resort to external devices like purpose, consequences, and historical
practice. As Professor David Strauss observed in his recent Harvard Law
Review Foreword, the presumed distinction between specific and general
constitutional provisions "has a long and illustrious history."32 Numerous
27. Primus, supra note 19, at 1696.
28. Surely no Senate Republican believed that Dred Scott merely declared preexisting law. For a
taste of Republicans' antipathy toward Dred Scott, see Section IV.B infra.
29. Justice Scalia reflected that undertaking exhaustive historical research on the Second
Amendment for his majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), was "like
being John Marshall for a little tiny portion of the Constitution." JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN
ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 351 (2009).
30. The Amendment itself reads, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
31. This view is prominently associated with Professor Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert. See
generally Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (2011).
32. David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term - Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean
Rice 5
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Supreme Court opinions assert that constitutional33 and statutory34 text can
be entirely unambiguous on its own terms. Scholars have echoed this
sentiment, often in reference to the Constitution's numerical provisions.35
Yet the perceived clarity of constitutional text has long been influenced
by extratextual factors.36 And in three recent high-profile cases, the
Supreme Court has invoked purposive and consequentialist considerations
in deciding whether statutory text was clear in the first place.37 It might
seem unthinkable that this move could ever become necessary when
interpreting "mathematical" constitutional provisions. Yet Owen's
generation managed to fight over how one such "breathtakingly exact
judgment[]" 38-the seven-year provision-applied to a strange situation.
On a quick glance, the Constitution's text alone does not seem to require
consecutive, immediately preceding citizenship periods. But the text
suddenly seems suppler when one realizes that Owen's "cumulative"
reading would allow aliens to serve in the House, Senate, and the
presidency. Owen's case thus shows the folly of blanket generalizations
about numerical constitutional clauses, and of the effort to classify any
legal text as utterly "clear" without remaining open to extratextual
considerations.
And third, if the Elections Committee had studied Revels's victory,
Owen's case might have embodied a larger legal principle-that historical
practices repugnant to the modern constitutional order should never be
accorded residual legal effect. This insight offers the hope of at least some
common ground in one of constitutional law's most contentious
enterprises: the identification of unenumerated fundamental rights under
the Due Process Clause. Two competing approaches fuel this ever-
simmering methodological conflict. One is largely deductive and open-
ended, requiring the exercise of reasoned judgment in prototypical
common-law fashion. The other is inductive, recognizing only those rights
with an amply documented historical pedigree.39
In the 2015 case of Kerry v. Din,4 0 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
invoked Section 3 of the Expatriation Act-Owen's very nemesis-in
What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1, 59 (2015).
33. See infra note 601 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 603 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 602 and accompanying text.
36. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text,
64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1231-55 (2015); see also infra notes 609-612 and accompanying text.
37. See generally Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407 (2015). He
focused on Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074
(2015), and King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
38. John F. Manning, Separation ofPowers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1979 (2011).
39. For a useful overview of this doctrinal schizophrenia, see Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme Court,
2014 Term - Comment. A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147,
148-54, 162-64 (2015).
40. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
6 [Vol. 29:1
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denying that an asserted liberty interest was "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."4 1 Scalia acknowledged that current equal-
protection doctrine and "modem moral principles" are squarely aligned
against marital expatriation.4 2 Yet he allowed the mere historical existence
of an older, blatantly unconstitutional legal order to affirmatively shape
modem constitutional doctrine, much as Senate Democrats had sought to
do in 1870. (Lawson's challenge was adjudicated in a similar fashion in
1930, likely because of Owen's unfamiliarity with Revels's regime-
bridging triumph.)
The Expatriation Act, like Dred Scott, issued from an institution under
the temporary thrall of un-American constitutional commitments. Just as
Reconstruction Republicans refused to "go back and reason upon the
principles" of a slaveholders' juristocracy,4 3  fundamental-rights
identification should shun historical sources that offend "the Constitution
under which we live this day."" And more broadly, constitutional
adjudicators should never affirmatively invoke universally rejected
historical practices in a law-generating fashion.
I. UNPACKING RUTH'S RIDDLE: THE LAW AS IT STOOD
Resolving William Lawson's challenge to Owen's eligibility required
the House to consider a citizenship-stripping law, a potentially regime-
shifting constitutional amendment, and a corrective statute that purported
to expunge an established historical fact when the aggrieved party met a
specified condition. This Part untangles the web of applicable law and
imagines several ways in which the House could have solved this peculiar
constitutional puzzle.
A. Judging Qualifications
In a clearly marked departure from conventional accounts of the
separation of powers, the Constitution provides that "[e]ach House shall
be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members." 45 In deciding whether a member-elect satisfies the enumerated
age, citizenship, and residency requirements, "each chamber acts as the
sole arbiter without external constraint."4 6 There is "no appeal" from this
"unlimited" authority.47  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
41. Id. at 2134 (plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
42. Id. at 2136; see id. at 2135 ("[T]hese early regulations were premised on the derivative
citizenship of women, a legacy of the law of coverture.").
43. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1564 (1870) (statement of Sen. Sawyer).
44. Id. (statement of Sen. Drake).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
46. Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House of
Representatives, 1789-2002, 18 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 112, 112 (2004).
47. Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., Contested Congressional Elections in Recent Years, 54 POL. SCI. Q.
187, 188 (1939). Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), refused to allow the House of
72017]
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acknowledged the legislative branches' prerogative to "make an
unconditional and final judgment" regarding these three qualifications.48
So despite one observer's proposal that the Court take Owen's case if a
partisan Elections Committee bungled it,4 9 only the House could have
legitimately decided her fate.
B. "Seven Years a Citizen"
When judging qualifications, the House enforces three Article I
imperatives: Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old, inhabit
the states from which they are chosen, and have "been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States."so I have found no trace of any Framer or
ratifier giving a moment's thought to the problem of inconsecutive
citizenship periods (or prophesying the policy of involuntary marital
expatriation)."' Yet their "mathematical" House Qualifications Clause
promises absolute exclusion for those who fall within its prohibitory
scope. What was the seven-year requirement designed to accomplish?
The Framers broke with early English practice in allowing naturalized
citizens to serve in Congress.52 The Committee of Detail originally
proposed that each House member "shall have been a citizen of the United
States for at least three years before his election. "53 George Mason
strenuously objected: he "was for opening a wide door for emigrants," but
he "did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us &
govern us." 54 Mason thought three years' citizenship insufficient to
"ensur[e] that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the
Representative."5 ' He also feared that "a rich foreign Nation, for example
Representatives to exclude a member-elect for reasons unrelated to Article I's age, citizenship, and
residency qualifications, but it left untouched congressional interpretive primacy within those three
domains. Id. at 522.
48. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972); cf Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238
(1993) (holding that because Article I grants the Senate the "sole Power to try all impeachments," its
chosen impeachment procedures are nonjusticiable).
49. See Erma E. Cole, Op-Ed., A Case for the Supreme Court, THE SUN (Baltimore), Feb. 12,
1930, at 10 (arguing that the House should "give the case to the Supreme Court" if the Committee's
decision "would be an arbitrary one and decided by a party vote").
50. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Similarly, senators must be at least thirty years old, inhabit the
states from which they are chosen, and have "been nine Years a Citizen of the United States."Id. art. I,§ 3, cl. 3.
51. This was widely assumed to be true in 1930 and became a recurring talking point. See, e.g.,
Ruth Bryan Owen's Case, LUDINGTON DAILY NEWS (MI), Jan. 23, 1930, at 4 [hereinafter Owen's
Case] ("Now a case like Mrs. Owen's never entered the heads of the lawyers in the constitutional
convention of 1787. The political emancipation of women was then 137 years in the future.").
52. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 70 (2005).
53. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 178 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS]. Professor Mary Bilder has recently explored the pitfalls of treating James
Madison's notes from the Philadelphia Convention as sacrosanct. See generally MARY SARAH
BILDER, MADISON'S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015). But Professor
Bilder does not claim that Madison tinkered specifically with his synopsis of the debate over what
became the seven-year provision, nor is it obvious why he would have done so.
54. 2 RECORDS, supra note 53, at 216.
55. Id. According to Justice Story, the seven-year provision required "naturalized citizens to
8 [Vol. 29:1
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Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into
the Legislature for insidious purposes."56
Mason moved to substitute "seven" for "three," and all states but one
agreed to the change." When the Convention revisited the question,
Elbridge Gerry warned that "[fjoreign powers will intermeddle in our
affairs .... Persons having foreign attachments will be sent among us &
insinuated into our councils, in order to be made instruments for their
purposes."" Hugh Williamson then proposed to increase the requirement
to nine years.59 He wished the United States "to acquire as fast as possible
national habits" unsullied by wealthy emigrants' "luxurious examples."6 0
The Convention ultimately voted down all departures from the seven-year
rule.61
In accommodating clashing visions of eligibility, the Framers thus
constitutionalized what they believed to be a precise citizenship
requirement for federal legislative service. 62 By formulating congressional
qualifications in a most rule-like fashion-"seven years a citizen," rather
than "devoid of foreign attachments"-the Framers thus forbade future
Congresses to monitor candidates' Americanism directly. Significantly (if
unsurprisingly), this debate proceeded on the shared premise that federal
legislators must actually be U.S. citizens. The seven-year provision
emerged from disagreement over how quickly foreign-born immigrants
could be clothed with constitutional authority after undergoing
naturalization.
To forestall legislative self-entrenchment, the Convention also rejected a
plan to permit Congress to regulate its own membership qualifications.63
By virtue of being settled in Article I, congressional qualifications were
understood to be tightly fixed rather than legislatively regulable.
acquire a reasonable familiarity with the principles of our institutions and with the interests of the
people." JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 75
(1842). Justice James Wilson understood the requirement to perform two functions: "1. That the
constituents might have a full and mature opportunity of knowing the character and merit of their
representative. 2. That the representative might have a full and mature opportunity of knowing the
dispositions and interests of his constituents." Of the Constitutions of the United States and of
Pennsylvania-of the Legislative Department, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON,
L.L.D. 117, 141 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804).
56. 2 RECORDS, supra note 53, at 216; see also A Republican Federalist, To the Members of the
Convention of Massachusetts, Feb. 2, 1788, reprinted in I THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 185
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("Will there not be immediately planted in the several States, men of
abilities, who, having the appearance of privates, will nevertheless be in the pay of foreign
powers? .. . [W]ill you not be the puppets of foreign Courts?").
57. 2 RECORDS, supra note 53, at 216.
58. Id. at 268.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison would have required "mere[] Citizenship"; they
assumed that Congress's uniform rule of naturalization would set the probationary period sufficiently
high. Id
62. In other words, this deceptively "clear text" was "the product of deliberate compromise," not
of "an inattentive mistake." Re, supra note 37, at 418.
63. 2 RECORDS, supra note 53, at 250; AMAR, supra note 52, at 68.
Rice 9
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Majoritarian contraction of the roster of eligible candidates would, in
Madison's words, "subvert the Constitution."6
Needless to say, Owen was no British tool, no alien adventurer
insinuating herself into the councils of state. If she stood out as a
"luxurious example," it was thanks to the richness of her republican
learning.
C. Marriage as Treason: The Expatriation Act of 1907
On March 2, 1907, it became the policy of the United States that "any
American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her
husband."6 5 Section 3 of the Expatriation Act was uniformly interpreted to
divest these women of their American citizenship, whether they remained
in the United States or lived abroad.66 A woman therefore incurred the
same penalty for marrying a Canadian as she would for assisting
America's military enemies. 67 In fact, assumption of her husband's
nationality became "an unwritten part of a married woman's nuptial
contract."68 When Section 3 became law, no woman had ever been elected
to Washington. 69 So congressmen probably didn't realize they were
effectively legislating another membership qualification: 70 no American
woman who had married an alien could serve in Congress.
In 1830, the Supreme Court held that an American woman who had
taken a British husband did not lose her citizenship by virtue of her
marriage.7 ' A generation later, Congress selectively overrode the
common-law doctrine of perpetual allegiance in providing that any foreign
woman who married an American would "be deemed and taken to be a
citizen." 72 Once Congress later declared voluntary self-expatriation to be a
"natural and inherent right of all people,"73 it eliminated a major
theoretical obstacle to equality of derivative citizenship-that is, the equal
right of all women to have no separate and independent nationality of their
own.
64. 2 RECORDS, supra note 53, at 250.
65. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
66. John P. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory
Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 44-45 (1950).
67. See Anne Marie Nicolosi, "We Do Not Want Our Girls To Marry Foreigners ": Gender, Race,
and American Citizenship, 13 NWSA J. 1, 11 (2001) ("[W]omen who married aliens faced the same
punishment as if they had committed treason.").
68. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 4; see also Kerry Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
407, 414 (2013) (concluding that, after the 1907 law, "a woman's marital identity [w]as her primary
identity-producing legal status").
69. Jeannette Rankin, the first woman elected to Congress, took her seat in 1917. NORMA SMITH,
JEANNETTE RANKIN: AMERICA'S CONSCIENCE 8, 103 (2002).
70. This assumes the correctness of Lawson's "immediately preceding" view; otherwise, a
noncitizen could assume office. See Section III.B.5 infra.
71. See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 246 (1830) ("[Mjarriage with an alien, whether a friend
or an enemy, produces no dissolution of the native allegiance of the wife.").
72. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604 (1855).
73. Expatriation Act of 1868, ch. 249, § 1, 15 Stat. 223 (1868).
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As abhorrent as Section 3's citizenship-stripping feature seems in
hindsight, the Expatriation Act passed with little fanfare. The Act was but
one element of a bureaucratically devised program to codify, clarify, and
tighten citizenship policies at a time of increased anxiety over
immigration.74 America joined most other nations in declaring women's
citizenship totally derivative of their husbands'.75 While the bill was
pending, virtually no one publicly debated the merits of renouncing
America's commitment to native-born women with exotic romantic
preferences. 76 Its suddenness came as a shock to women's-rights
advocates, who were apparently kept in the dark.77
Section 3 couldn't have been entirely unexpected-"wanderlustful"
American heiresses had been publicly maligned for purchasing aristocratic
bridegrooms, and such scolding continued apace after 1907. These
"scattered eruptions" of indignation never spawned a political
movement,'78 but they provided a prepackaged apology for the Expatriation
Act (sometimes called the "Gigolo Act" 79) and helped sustain its
unparalleled harshness as several states enfranchised women in the early
twentieth century.80
Many Americans came to see transatlantic marriages as "loveless unions
that exchanged capital for class."81 In 1893, the New York Times published
a scandalous list of "American Women Who Have Given Their Hearts and
Money to Foreigners," with the amount of lost "enviable American cash"
($50,000,000 in all) recorded alongside each international wedding.8 2 One
prominent minister viewed these marriages as "a matter of sale and
purchase" in which American girls "sold their womanhood, their country,
their language, and their religion for husbands who are peculiarly
contemptible cads."83 Congressman Charles McGavin berated the women
who "sacrific[ed] their souls and honor upon the altar of snobbery and
vice," who are "not satisfied with any other name than Countess Spaghetti
74. Roche, supra note 66, at 25-26; BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 56-57; GROSSMAN &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 65. 1907 was the "very height of immigration, when about a million
immigrants were entering the United States each year." Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's
Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1461 (1998).
75. SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE, MARRIAGE AND THE CIVIC RIGHTS OF WOMEN: SEPARATE
DOMICIL AND INDEPENDENT CITIZENSHIP 20 (1931).
76. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 63; see Nicolosi, supra note 67, at 14 ("No Congressional
records remain of the discussions of the law, only a few lines in The Congressional Record, making it
impossible to know precisely what lawmakers were thinking when they passed the act.").
77. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 64.
78. Id at 61.
79. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
456 (1997).
80. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
1776-1995, at 227 (1996) (detailing the early successes of the women's-suffrage movement).
81. Dana Calise Cooper, Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and
Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1945, at 214 (December 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation)
(Texas Christian University).
82. Have Found Husbands Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1893, at 2.
83. Says Our Women Influence Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1908, at 6.
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or Macaroni." 84 Even President Theodore Roosevelt denounced the man
"whose son is a fool and his daughter a foreign Princess." 5 Congressman
N.E. Kendell put the problem most succinctly: "[W]e do not want our girls
to marry foreigners."86
Congressmen frequently assumed that women invited any dreadful
consequences of their international marriages. Loss of citizenship and
confiscation of property87 were "a good lesson to our American girls to
marry American boys."8 When a "prodigal daughter"8 9 made a different
choice, she effected a "clear, open, broad daylight, voluntary surrender of
citizenship."90 As Congressman Samuel Dickstein later mused, "They
brought it about themselves, did they not? ... The women who married
these foreign dukes and counts, these duchesses and countesses and that
sort of stuff, when there are enough Americans for them to select from." 9 1
In Mackenzie v. Hare (1915),92 the Supreme Court upheld Section 3 of
the Expatriation Act against a constitutional challenge for precisely these
reasons. Congress didn't annul anyone's citizenship, the Court reasoned;
the Expatriation Act merely proposed a "condition voluntarily entered
into, with notice of the consequences."9 3 Ethel Mackenzie's betrothal was
''as voluntary and distinctive as expatriation and its consequence must be
considered as elected." 94 Mackenzie's selection of a British husband, in
other words, manifested her intent to be forsaken by her motherland.95
So when Ruth Bryan exchanged vows with Reginald Owen, Earl of
84. American Women of Title Scorned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1908, at 3; see also 62 CONG. REC.
9053 (1922) (statement of Rep. Herrick) (chastising the American women who married "some Count
No Account, some degenerate from over the seas").
85. Roosevelt Censures Foreign Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1908, at 18.
86. Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 21358, Relating to
Expatriation of Citizens, 62d Cong. 20 (1912) (statement of Rep. Kendell).
87. American-born women married to citizens of the Central Powers were themselves alien
enemies during World War I. The Alien Property Custodian confiscated over $25 million of property
from them during the Great War. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 72.
88. Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of
Representatives, Relative to Citizenship of American Women Married to Foreigners, 65th Cong. 33
(1918) (statement of Rep. Welty) [hereinafter Citizenship ofAmerican Women].
89. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 6.
90. Citizenship ofAmerican Women, supra note 88, at 20 (statement of Rep. Raker).
91. Hearings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of
Representatives, Immigration and Citizenship of American-Born Women Married to Aliens, 69th
Cong. 18 (1926) (statement of Rep. Dickstein).
92. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
93. Id. at 312.
94. Id
95. As one observer noted, Mackenzie's theory of the Expatriation Act "makes mere marriage
conclusive evidence of intent to transfer allegiance.... This cannot be called an enforced transfer, for
the doing of the act necessary to constitute the change must be regarded as at will." W.W.S.,
Comment, Expatriation Resulting from Marriage to Alien Husband, 14 MICH. L. REV. 233, 235
(1916). In 1930, this reasoning "seem[ed] rather far-fetched" to Congressman J. Lincoln Newhall of
the Elections Committee. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 33. He contended that denaturalized
American women "have never invited [expatriation] any more than the martyrs of the ages have
invited dire consequences because of their belief in a principle or their adherence to a faith." 72 CONG.
REC. 10196 (1930) (statement of Rep. Newhall).
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Nothing, she, too, "voluntarily" cast off her native allegiance. The
Congress she loved had foisted upon her an impossible choice between
lifelong happiness and American citizenship. She became Ruth Bryan
Owen, a virtual traitor to her country.
D. American Again: The Cable Act of 1922
Congress emphatically renounced the policy of women's derivative
citizenship in 1922. Never again would the daughters of statesmen self-
expatriate by taking foreign husbands; and if the Expatriation Act's
victims so desired, they could be fully restored to their civic birthright.
The Cable Act opened with a mostly symbolic gesture that nonetheless
captured emergent constitutional attitudes: "the right of any woman to
become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or
abridged because of her sex or because she is a married woman." 96 Section
2 discontinued the practice of automatically conferring citizenship on alien
women who married Americans. 97 Conversely, Section 3 provided that "a
woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the
United States by reason of her marriage after the passage of this act." 98
But what of those who had ceased to be "woman citizens" between 1907
and 1922?
Section 7 expressly repealed the Expatriation Act policy that had
affected Owen and many others.99 But this repeal didn't automatically
restore lost citizenship; instead, marital expatriates could become
naturalized more quickly than normal. 00 "After her naturalization,"
Section 4 proclaimed, "she shall have the same citizenship status as if her
marriage had taken place after the passage of this act."'01 What status was
that? One of a woman who had never "cease[d] to be a citizen of the
United States by reason of her marriage," according to Section 3.102 Put
simply, Owen and others like her had suffered a unique and undeserved
hardship. This would never happen again. As long as these women
complied with the Cable Act's relaxed naturalization procedures, federal
law would regard them as lifelong citizens.1 0 3
96. Cable Act of 1922, ch. 411, § 1, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922).
97. See id. § 2 ("[A]ny woman who marries a citizen of the United States ... shall not become a
citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage.").
98. Id. § 3. Eight years later, the fiercely nativist Congressman Albert Johnson boasted that "[n]o
woman American citizen surrenders her own citizenship under any circumstances. She is protected by
our laws." 72 CONG. REC. 9319 (1930) (statement of Rep. Albert Johnson).
99. § 7, 42 Stat. 1021.
100. See id. § 4 (permitting such women to be "naturalized as provided by [S]ection 2" of the
Cable Act). Section 2 waived the required declaration of intention to seek naturalization and lowered
the minimum period of U.S. residency from five years to one. Id. § 2.
101. Id. § 4.
102. Id. § 3.
103. Professor Candice Bredbenner writes that these women were to be regarded as ordinary
naturalized citizens-"The new law allowed the government to disavow any knowledge of this
woman's former status as a U.S. citizen." BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 100. But this interpretation
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Universal female suffrage was the chief motivating cause of a law that
proved an ambitious first step toward full citizenship equality for women,
or what Owen liked to call the "dignity and individuality" of female
citizenship.'" The Nineteenth Amendment's several influences on the
Sixty-seventh Congress are worth distinguishing. On the one hand,
congressmen felt the mighty pull of practical politics. Automatic
naturalization of American grooms' foreign brides had once been touted as
a low-stakes fix to promote family unity and cultural assimilation.0 o But
the prospect of enfranchising masses of ignorant alien newlyweds
prompted sober reconsideration, especially at a time when Congress was
restricting immigration at unprecedented rates. 06  These women
supposedly knew "no more about the American Constitution than they
know about the Egyptian Book of the Dead." 07 So making them earn
American ballots made plenty of sense.
On an even more practical note, within a month of the Nineteenth
Amendment's ratification, female activists secured pledges from both
parties to embrace women's independent citizenship in their 1920
platforms.' 08  Federal lawmakers sensed universal enthusiasm for the
Expatriation Act's repeal among what they expected to be an energetic
and cohesive voting bloc.1 09 Antagonizing millions of newly enfranchised
women would have been terrible politics. Unsurprisingly, then, a
Republican National Committee executive remarked that "[s]everal
Congressmen whom I know feel that their seats depend on the passing of
this bill."''0
Yet several Cable Act supporters reinforced cold, hard realities with
confident lessons in constitutional law. Their Nineteenth Amendment
forbade more than just gender discrimination in the bestowal of voting
defies Section 4's unmistakably clear language, as well as Congressman Cable's lucid explanation of
the provision's import. See American Citizenship Rights of Women: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Immigration, United States Senate, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1933) [hereinafter
Citizenship Rights of Women] (expressing Cable's view that naturalization under the Cable Act
"restored [expatriated women] to the status of natural born citizens"); Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at
54 (quoting Cable's written affirmation that Owen "stands ... as one who has always been a citizen of
the United States").
104. 72 CONG. REC. 9318-19 (1930) (statement of Rep. Owen); Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at
55, 59.
105. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 9, 17; see also CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., Ist Sess. 170
(1854) (statement of Rep. Cutting) (claiming that such derivative citizenship "is a relief to the
husband" because "it aids him in the instilling of proper principles in his children").
106. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 17 (noting the shift toward "comprehensive and restrictive
policies on naturalization and immigration").
107. "IAm a Citizen, Too", 7 LIFE AND LABOR 95 (1918); see Abrams, supra note 68, at 417 ("It
took enfranchisement through the Nineteenth Amendment ... and the specter of illiterate, potentially
disloyal, and now voting foreign wives to finally persuade Congress that derivative national
citizenship was a bad idea.").
108. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 81.
109. Id. at 81, 97; see also Abrams, supra note 68, at 411 (observing that the Act "aroused
vociferous complaint from feminists").
110. BREDBENNER, supra note 24, at 104.
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The tendency has been constantly toward extending the rights of
women so as to bring them more and more nearly on an equality
with man.... [T]here was no particular force in the demand for
this bill until the nineteenth amendment became a part of the
organic law of the land. But when women were given civil
equality with men, the right to vote, it seems to me at that
moment it became ludicrous for us to say that thereafter the
rights of women to citizenship shall be dependent on the rights
of men. At that moment the doctrine of dependent or derived
citizenship became as archaic as the doctrine of ordeal by fire."'
One congressman insisted that "[u]nder the nineteenth amendment the
thing is equal.... The nineteenth amendment has placed women in the
same position as men."" 2 In short, "The same laws ought to govern the
women as govern the men.""3 Congressman Cable himself believed that
"[s]ince the nineteenth amendment grants equal suffrage to women, so
also should they have equal rights with reference to citizenship."ll 4 If an
American man who married an alien woman got to keep his citizenship,
"so also should the American girl who marries the alien man.""' In other
words, the Nineteenth Amendment precluded Congress from perpetuating
a non-uniform "Rule of Naturalization" (and expatriation) between the
sexes.I11
111. 62 CONG. REc. 9047 (1922) (statement of Rep. Rogers); see id. at 9059 (statement of Rep.
Volk) (contending that, by virtue of the Nineteenth Amendment, "[t]he doctrine of dependent or
derived citizenship has become archaic").
112. Id. at 9061, 9063 (statement of Rep. Stephens). Stephens believed that marital expatriation
was "something in the past" even before the 1907 Act's repeal. Id. at 9062; see also id. at 9040
(statement of Rep. Vaile) (asserting that women's citizenship "should be endowed with the same
dignity .. . as a man's citizenship"); id. at 9048 (statement of Rep. Siegel) ("As to the right of the
woman to be an independent American citizen . . . the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution has
settled that."); id. at 9057 (statement of Rep. Albert Johnson) (insisting that the Cable Act had
"become[] necessary" after "the enactment of the nineteenth amendment"); id. at 9059 (statement of
Rep. Volk) (claiming that "in the last few years .. . [t]he tendency has been toward extending the
rights of women and to place them on a plane of civil equality with men").
1 3. Id. at 9063 (statement of Rep. Stephens); see id. ("They all ought to come under the same
naturalization law, because they are all citizens and electors alike. ... What is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander."); id. (statement of Rep. Kincheloe) (demanding that "discrimination in favor of
the man" be discontinued); id. at 9060 (statement of Rep. Chalmers) ("Having the nineteenth
amendment, which places women on the same footing with men, the laws governing naturalization
should be about the same for both of them, should they not?").
114. Id at 9046 (statement of Rep. Cable).
115. Id.; see id at 9043 (statement of Rep. Raker) ("[W]e are trying to place the American
woman upon the same base as the American man."); id. at 9057 (statement of Rep. Raker) ("The
women have been denied their rights. We want to equalize them as nearly as we can."); id at 9060
(statement of Rep. London) (declaring that the Cable Act's proponents sought "to place the individual,
irrespective of sex, on a basis of equality in society"); id at 9062 (statement of Rep. Vaile) (decrying
"inequitable distinction[s] between the citizenship of women and the citizenship of men").
116. As a result, the Cable Act "abolished many deplorable discriminations against women."
Citizenship Rights of Women, supra note 103, at 29.
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These parallel constitutional and statutory reforms followed a familiar
pattern. Once the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized territorial
birthright citizenship in 1868,"' excluding African-Americans from the
privilege of naturalization lost any justification. Accordingly, the
Naturalization Act of 1870 "extended [the naturalization laws] to aliens of
African nativity and to persons of African descent.""' The Nineteenth
Amendment's blazing ethos cried out for parallel statutory progress. The
Cable Act therefore outlawed sex discrimination in the process of
obtaining naturalization and in the expatriative effects of marriage." 9
E. Counting to Seven
Lawson v. Owen presented the House Elections Committee with three
separate interpretive issues: the meaning and proper application of the
Qualifications Clause's seven-year provision, Section 4 of the Cable Act,
and the Nineteenth Amendment.
The Committee could have interpreted the Qualifications Clause to
require either seven immediately prior years of citizenship or any seven
years, whether they happened decades ago or in eighty-four one-month
increments. It could have regarded Section 4's restorative provision as
either a valid enactment or a nullity, Congress being powerless to
retroactively erase the constitutional implications of uncontested historical
facts. And it could have read the Nineteenth Amendment narrowly to
simply prohibit the denial of suffrage to women, or broadly as a
revolutionary shift in the assumptions of American constitutionalism. In
either case, the Committee might have granted marital expatriations
continuing mathematical force in contested elections. If the Nineteenth
Amendment changed much more than its bare text bespoke,'20 the
Committee could have instead entirely denied the old, unjust law any
vestigial influence in Qualifications Clause contexts, as Republicans did
with Dred Scott in 1870.121
To prevail, Lawson had to convince the House of three propositions: 1)
"seven years" meant the immediately preceding seven years, 2) Section 4
of the Cable Act was unauthorized by Congress's enumerated powers, and
3) the now-unconstitutional expatriation law's ugly tentacles should still
penetrate into modem constitutional adjudication. To retain her seat,
Owen just needed to persuade the House that any one of these statements
was false.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.").
118. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870).
119. For one unfortunate exception, see supra note 7.
120. Cf Primus, supra note 19, at 1684 (describing the prevailing Republican view that "events of
the Civil War era changed the Constitution even more than the text of the Reconstruction Amendments
indicates").
121. See infra notes 511-525 and accompanying text.
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II. RUTH'S REMARKABLE LIFE
A. Youth and Marriage
Ruth Bryan was born an American citizen in 1885, the descendant of
eleven Revolutionary soldiers. 12 2 She grew up in the shadow of political
greatness. Her silver-tongued father, William Jennings Bryan, served in
the House of Representatives from 1891 to 1895.123 Ruth joined the family
in Washington and frequently accompanied her father to work. 12 4 She
watched House debates with "awed delight."l 25 As she later recalled,
"when I was so small [that] I could scarcely see above the top of his desk
in congress I stood beside him in that assembly and listened to his defense
of democratic principles."1 26 The Capitol dome became "an obsession and
a symbol" to her, 127 and she "vowed to return in triumph" as a public
servant in her own right.1 28 Many of her colleagues in 1929-30 were old
enough to remember this "sweetheart of the House" daily slaking her thirst
for political oratory. 129
Ruth campaigned with her father during each of his three presidential
crusades. The Bryans traveled tens of thousands of miles by rail on these
precedent-shattering nationwide campaigns.130 Ruth was her father's
secretary in 1908 and cheered proudly from the platform as he accepted
the Democratic nomination."' She addressed large crowds directly on his
behalf. 13 2 Her uncle, Charles Bryan, later served as Mayor of Lincoln,
Governor of Nebraska, and the 1924 Democratic vice-presidential
candidate. 33 As one columnist wrote, Ruth took in "the entire political
landscape of the times, studying men and events and political manners
with a cool eye that never missed anything." 34 She also wrote nationally
syndicated newspaper articles and filled in for her father on the
Chautauqua lecture circuit,13 5 sometimes speaking every night for months
on end.1 36
122. 72 CONG. REC. 9317 (1929) (statement of Rep. Owen).
123. Bryan, William Jennings, in BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774-2005, at 730, 731 (Andrew R. Dodge & Betty K. Koed, eds. 2005).
124. E. LYNNE WRIGHT, MORE THAN PETTICOATS: REMARKABLE FLORIDA WOMEN 69 (2d ed.)
(2010).
125. Sally Vickers, Ruth Bryan Owen: Florida's First Congresswoman and Lifetime Activist, 77
FLA. HIST. Q. 445, 446 (1999).
126. Daughter ofBryan Urges Smith Victory, ATL. CONST., Oct. 20, 1928, at 1.
127. Vickers, supra note 125, at 446.
128. MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 170 (2006).
129. MATTHEW ANDREW WASNIEWSKI, WOMEN IN CONGRESS, 1917-2006, at 89 (2d ed.) (2007).
130. Vickers, supra note 125, at 447.
131. Id.
132. KAZIN, supra note 128, at 171.
133. Id. at 199.
134. Marjory S. Douglas, Bryan Name Goes Back into National Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1928, at 164.
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Bryan's daughter brushed up against the Qualifications Clause for the
first time by announcing her candidacy for a House seat in the 1910
elections.137 (She declared mere days after her twenty-fourth birthday, and
would turn twenty-five only a month after the election.) At this time, no
woman had ever served in Congress, nor would for eight years.138 But life
reshaped her pioneering political plans. On May 3, 1910, Ruth Bryan
married Reginald Altham Owen, whom she had met while studying voice
in Germany.13 9 Owen was British, an officer in the Royal Engineer Corps,
but no hereditary peer.140 Ruth gushingly described their connection as "a
real romance ... real romance always."1 41 The Owens would enjoy a
"rewarding marriage filled with mutual respect, support, and
friendship."1 4 2  Ruth called Reginald her "understanding life
companion."1 43
Ruth Bryan Owen took a husband during the Expatriation Act's infancy,
before the notorious case of Mackenzie v. Hare upheld the Act's
constitutionality. I have found no evidence that she, or anyone, realized at
the time that her choice of a spouse worked an immediate and
unconditional loss of American citizenship. None of the New York Times
articles announcing her engagement or describing the wedding ceremony
mentioned the automatic consequence of expatriation. 1" Nor, so far as I
can tell, did the scores of other newspapers that carried the information.
The United States Congress silently withdrew Owen's dearest
possession, her constitutional birthright. This was no "clear, open, broad
daylight, voluntary surrender of citizenship."'4 5 Owen's will operated only
in "the conjugal change." 46 As an Elections Committee member rightly
concluded, Owen's expatriation "was not due to a voluntary action on her
part ... but was forced upon her by reason of the law."1 47
137. Bryan's Daughter Will Run, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1909, at 1.
138. See supra note 69. Years after Owen announced her abortive congressional candidacy,
traditionalists were still arguing that the Qualifications Clause excludes women because it uses the
masculine pronoun "he." See generally Does Constitution Permit Woman To Serve in House?,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 19, 1916, at 53.
139. STUART MCIVER, 3 TOUCHED BY THE SUN: THE FLORIDA CHRONICLES 121 (2008).
140. WRIGHT, supra note 124, at 73.
141. Letter from Ruth Bryan Leavitt to Carrie Dunlap (Aug. 16, 1909), quoted in SARAH P.
VICKERS, THE LIFE OF RUTH BRYAN OWEN: FLORIDA'S FIRST CONGRESSWOMAN AND AMERICA'S
FIRST WOMAN DIPLOMAT 34-35 (1994).
142. VICKERS, supra note 141, at 71.
143. Id. at 72.
144. See Ruth Bryan To Wed Again, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1910, at 1; Some Interesting
International Matches, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1910, at 11; Leavitt Wedding To-morrow, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 1910, at 6; Bryan's Daughter Marries, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1910, at 2.
145. Citizenship ofAmerican Women, supra note 88, at 20 (statement of Rep. Raker).
146. Objections To Seating Mrs. Owen, BILOxI DAILY HER., Dec. 6, 1928, at 4 [hereinafter
Objections to Seating].
147. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 33 (statement of Rep. Newhall).
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B. War Service, Chautauqua Speaking, and Civic Engagement
Owen indeed left America to be with her husband. But she hardly
"prostitute[d] her American name to the scandals, the vices, the social
immoralities and moral impurities of foreign cities."l4 8 She never voted in
England, swore allegiance to the king, or exercised the slightest privilege
inconsistent with her native civic fidelity. 49 When the Great War came,
she devoted herself to relieving her fellow creatures' suffering. Along with
Lou Hoover, wife of future-President Herbert Hoover, Owen served as co-
secretary-treasurer of the London-based American Women's War Relief
Fund.so This organization employed destitute widows and starving
soldiers' wives to sew garments, then shipped these necessities to the front
and to a three-thousand-bed military hospital."' This hospital was so
essential to the Allied military effort that the American government
assumed its administration in 1917.152
Some women in Owen's organization were American citizens, and
some involuntary expatriates,153 but all of them self-identified as
American-hence the association's name. 15 4  American newspapers
praising Owen's efforts admired the "body of American women living in
London""'s and commended Owen for "endear[ing] herself to her English
cousins" by raising colossal sums of relief cash. 5 6 By 1914, Owen
regretfully acknowledged that "I am a Britisher now, because my husband
is."'57 But her Anglo-American humanitarian work "only makes me love
both countries more."' 58 She might have been expected to revere the
148. James G. Blaine, The Corner-Stone ofReligion and a Keystone ofthe Temple ofMorality, in
LIFE AND WORK OF JAMES G. BLAINE 504 (John Clark Ridpath & Selden Connor eds., 1893).
149. Citizenship Rights of Women, supra note 103, at 31; James M. Carson, Op-Ed., Mrs. Owen,
an Eligible Candidate, MIAMI NEWS, Apr. 14, 1926, at 37.
150. Vickers, supra note 125, at 451.
151. Id. at 451 n.26; U.S. Women Busy Aiding British in Relief Work, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 25,
1914, at 4 [hereinafter Women Busy Aiding].
152. Vickers, supra note 125, at 451 n.26.
153. Cooper, supra note 81, at 165.
154. As Owen told the Elections Committee in 1930, "This group, I want you to notice, were the
American Women's War Relief Fund." Owen Hearing, supra note I1, at 57 (statement of Rep. Owen).
She very likely emphasized "American," though the transcript doesn't indicate this. See also
Citizenship Rights of Women, supra note 103, at 31 ("At all times Mrs. Owen was looked upon by her
British friends as an American citizen, despite her actual legal status.").
155. Aid Soldiers' Wives, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1914, at 7 (emphasis added).
156. Women Busy Aiding, supra note 151 (emphasis added). As Elections Committee Chairman
Carroll Beedy saw the situation, Owen spent her time abroad "either working with our allies in the war
or ... closely associated with American citizens in public and charitable works of mutual interest. She
at no time lost the American point of view." 72 CONG. REC. 10194 (1930) (statement of Rep. Beedy).
157. Women Busy Aiding, supra note 151. But she later testified that "I always considered myself
and was always considered an American." Carson, supra note 149; see also 72 CONG. REC. 10202
(1930) (statement of Rep. Newhall) ("She is now, has always been, and will continue to be an
American woman.").
158. Women Busy Aiding, supra note 151. Congressman Kading of the Elections Committee later
asked her, "And the fact of your marriage to your husband, who was an English subject, had no effect
upon you in any way whatsoever along the line of tending to make you love the United States less, did
it?" Owen answered, "Of course, it could not have." Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 62 (statement of
Rep. Kading). So too with Owen's "aristocratic" colleagues of the War Relief Fund-their British
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nation that had elevated her father to the position of Secretary of State. 159
Beginning in 1915, Owen endured three gruesome years as a surgical
and operating-room nurse, 160 at one point treating her own ailing
husband. 16 1 She lived and worked "absolutely as near the war as I could be
without being myself a soldier." 62 Through her Allied war service, Owen
had "seen, experienced, endured and helped more than most women if
they should live a thousand years." 63 (The Veterans of Foreign Wars
inducted her as an honorary member in 1928-not a full member, because
the American government hadn't paid for her services after withdrawing
her citizenship.")
In 1919, the exhausted couple relocated to Florida in hopes of repairing
Reginald's shattered constitution. With four young children and a husband
to support on no income from her family,'6 5 Owen turned to what she
knew best: the Chautauqua lecture circuit. Though technically not an
American citizen, she became the highest-paid woman speaker on the
circuit. 166 Crowds (and newspapers) all across the country acclaimed
Owen's rare rhetorical gifts. She was "[a] man's woman"l 67 who
possessed "a power of animating the imagination of her hearers which is
remarkable."6 8 One writer pronounced Owen the most eloquent woman
he'd ever heard. 169 In sum, her singular American heritage and riveting
wartime experiences had produced "one of the leading women of the
nation." 7 0
marriages failed to efface the Americanism inscribed in their hearts. When Consuelo Vanderbilt (the
Duchess of Marlborough) returned home in 1902, the New York Times assured readers that "the
Duchess was a most democratic young woman. . . . [H]er seven years as one of the leaders of the
British aristocracy has in no wise changed her American spirit." Consuelo, Duchess of Marlborough,
Here, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1902, at 7. After her divorce, she resumed "a citizenship I would never
have resigned had the law of my day permitted me to retain it." CONSUELO VANDERBILT BALSAN,
THE GLITTER AND THE GOLD xiv (1953). Visiting her native Virginia in 1922, Nancy Langhorne
(Lady Astor) was introduced as "the sweetheart of two nations .. . the first woman ever to sit in the
British Parliament and the last woman in the world ever to forget the sacred soil of Virginia that bore
her." KAREN J. MUSOLF, FROM PLYMOUTH TO PARLIAMENT: A RHETORICAL HISTORY OF NANCY
ASTOR'S 1919 CAMPAIGN 155 (1999). The mayor of Scottsville, Virginia openly encouraged her to
return home and run for President. Id. When Lady Astor finished her American tour, she promptly
published a book entitled My Two Countries. Cooper, supra note 81, at 204.
159. See KAZIN, supra note 128, at 215-42 (chronicling William Jennings Bryan's tenure at the
State Department).
160. Bryan's Daughter, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 24, 1929, at 68.
161. Ruth Bryan Owen, ATTICA LEDGER TRIB., Aug. 27, 1921, at 1.
162. Letter from Ruth Bryan Owen to Carrie Dunlap (Mar. 3, 1916), quoted in VICKERS, supra
note 141, at 47.
163. Ruth Bryan Owen, THE COMMONER (Lincoln), Oct. 1, 1921, at 13.
164. Veterans Honor Mrs. Ruth Owen, MIAMI NEWS, May 22, 1928, at 12.
165. VICKERS, supra note 141, at 51. The war also destroyed Reginald's overseas investments.
Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 58.
166. Ruth Bryan Owen Rohde, DEDICATED WRITERS, http://www.dedicatedwriters.com/
biographies/Ruth-Bryan-Owen-Rohde-33654.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).
167. Mrs. Ruth Bryan Owen Will Lecture in Atlanta Today, ATL. CONST., Mar. 23, 1922, at 9.
1 68. Lecture by Bryan's Daughter Enthralls Atlanta Audience, ATL. CONST., Mar. 24, 1922, at 9.
169. Ruth Bryan Owen, CORSICANA DAILY SUN (TX), May 11, 1922, at 6.
170. Ruth Bryan Owen Talks at YMC.A. on Sunday, FT. WAYNE J. GAZ., Nov. 10, 1921, at 8.
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By campaigning with her father and mesmerizing Chautauqua audiences
in every state, Ruth Owen the alien came to "kno[w] her United States,
every nook and corner of it, from the large cities ... to the most obscure
county districts."' She habitually "learn[ed] all she could about whatever
locality she was in."l 72 Owen had to contract for these tours a year in
advance,"' but she never broke a speaking appointment. 174 In her own
caustic recollection, "the law of my country specified that I could not
regain my citizenship unless I presented myself on a certain date, in
Miami (a date not given me a year in advance), at the courthouse, when, in
order to take care of my children I had to be perhaps in North Dakota or in
Minnesota on that date." 75 So it wasn't until April 27, 1925, that Judge
Rhydon Call of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
finally declared Owen a citizen of the United States in accordance with the
Cable Act's renaturalization provisions.1 76
Owen shone as Miami's star citizen during the Chautauqua offseason.
With only mild exaggeration, a contemporary depicted her rise: "[S]oon
she was chairman, director or president of every civic, church and
educational movement in the State." 77 She "proved her good citizenship"
as president of the Miami Women's Club by instilling "principles of
Americanization" in aliens and citizens alike.1 78 The University of Miami
hired Owen as a speech professor in 1925. She donated her entire teaching
salary to subsidize scholarships for students who wrote the best essays on
citizenship.1 79 Soon after, Owen was elected vice president of the
University's Board of Regents.' 8 0
In 1927, Rollins College bestowed an honorary doctorate of laws on this
"[g]ood daughter of a good father, mistress of the spoken word, statesman
of both achievement and promise ... for your high concept of civic duty
and for your many services to your state and nation."'8 ' To consummate
her storied service to state and nation, Owen sought a seat in the beloved
Congress of her childhood, but also the very body that had expatriated her.
171. Douglas, supra note 134.
172. Id.
173. Owen Hearing, supra note I1, at 58.
174. Douglas, supra note 134.
175. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 60 (statement of Rep. Owen).
176. Id. at 16.
177. Duff Gilfond, Gentlewomen of the House, AMERICAN MERCURY (Baltimore), Oct. 1929, at
151, 153.
178. Grace Stone Hall, Ruth Bryan Owen Is Silent About Political Ambitions, MIAMI NEWS, Mar.
28, 1926, at 33.
179. Bryan 's Daughter, supra note 160. Owen "put her entire salary into scholarships ... in order
to give as many as possible her own deep appreciation of what it means to be a citizen of the United
States." Ruth Bryan Owen, Congresswoman, KERRVILLE DAILY TIMES (TX), July 11, 1929, at 3
[hereinafter Owen, Congresswoman].
180. MCIVER,supra note 139, at 120.
181. Vickers, supra note 125, at 445.
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C. The Election Years (1926-28)
When Owen first ran for Congress in 1926, the South had never sent a
woman to Washington.182 Florida still hadn't ratified the Nineteenth
Amendment." The state Democratic Party openly opposed Owen's
candidacy, preferring the eleven-year incumbent. 184 The New York Times
predicted she would "meet an overwhelming 'native son' sentiment,"
since "the voters of Florida are notably opposed to accepting women in
politics."'8 Owen ultimately lost the 1926 Democratic primary by a mere
776 votes-"which realistically was a triumph, considering the odds she
had faced."l 86
Owen suffered an even more crushing loss in December 1927-the
death of her husband Reginald. The British officer for whom Owen had
surrendered her American citizenship had become one of Miami's most
"substantial, beloved citizen[s]" and a keen observer of American
politics. 187 The American Legion had offered to support him in his poor
health, and it now stood on guard at the church door as mourners honored
their valiant soldier."8 The Miami News lamented his passing as "a
distinct loss to the community. "189
Reginald's widow transcended her "debilitating melancholy" 90 to run
for Congress again in 1928. Channeling her tireless father, Owen
campaigned in every precinct of her 588,000-resident district.19 ' She drove
sixteen thousand miles, gave over six hundred speeches, and sat down
with all ninety newspaper editors in her district. 192 Reflecting on Owen's
blistering primary campaign, one reporter marveled, "This weaker sex
stuff is exploded for me forever." 93 Owen thrashed the Democratic
incumbent,19 4 then bested Republican William Lawson by a nearly two-to-
one margin in November-on the same day that the Republican
presidential candidate cruised to a 17-percent margin of victory in
Florida.1 95
Through it all, this "First Lady of the South"' 96 passionately promoted
her pet virtue: good citizenship. In the midst of her primary campaign, she
182. Id. at 454.
183. VICKERS, supra note 141, at 4.
184. Vickers, supra note 125, at 456.
185. Bryan's Daughter Seeks Congress Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1926, at 3 [hereinafter Seeks
Congress Seat].
186. wRIGHT, supra note 124, at 74.
187. Major Reginald Owen, MIAMI NEWS, Dec. 13, 1927, at 6.
188. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 59.
189. Major Reginald Owen, supra note 187.
190. Vickers, supra note 125, at 456.
191. Id. at 458.
192. Id.; Gilfond, supra note 177, at 153.
193. Vickers, supra note 125, at 458.
194. She won by approximately 14,000 votes. Id. at 459.
195. Id. at 460; VICKERS, supra note 141, at 90.
196. VICKERS, supra note 141, at 90.
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sponsored a statewide oratorical contest on "Citizenship."l 9 7 She spoke on
"Better American Citizenship"l 98 and implored Florida's youth to ponder
the "seriousness of citizenship."1 99 Owen explained that the republic "rests
equally on the shoulders of every citizen. . . . [W]e need two ships inside
our republic-Citizenship and Statesmanship." 20 0 Why had she embarked
on such a grueling campaign? "I would fail in my duty to [my children] if
I did not set them an example of citizenship." 201 The government "can
only function perfectly when each citizen bears his share in this
responsibility." 202 Owen even promised to send a contingent of model
student-citizens to Washington every year at her own expense.203
Ruth Bryan Owen exuded republicanism. Her contemporaries, though,
described her as "regal"-soon to become the "queen of congress."204 One
newspaper editor imagined her ascension to the presidency.2 05 Probably no
one in America better appreciated the role of informed civic engagement
as the grist of good government. Yet in a singular irony of American
constitutional history, Owen's defeated Republican opponent charged that
she was insufficiently American to serve in the House of Representatives.
Perhaps he had a point.
III. CONTESTING OWEN'S CITIZENSHIP
A. Constitutional Politics in Florida's Fourth District
Only the House could authoritatively pass on Owen's eligibility. 20 6 But
why vote for someone the House might eventually disqualify? From the
outset, Owen wrestled with accusations that she could not constitutionally
serve in Congress (yet). Convincing voters that a Republican House would
seat her, and providing a cogent legal foundation for this prediction,
became indispensable to her political survival.
On April 8, 1926, Owen left a handwritten note with the Miami News in
which she announced her congressional candidacy.207 That very day, a
197. County Winners To Be Eligible, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 5, 1928, at 9.
198. Mrs. Ruth Owen To Talk Twice, MIAMI NEWS, Apr. 12, 1928, at 14.
199. Ruth Bryan Owen Appeals for Enlistment of Youth in Ranks ofActive Citizens, PALM BEACH
POST, May 16, 1928, at 2.
200. Id.
201. Bryan's Daughter Fights for Service, PITT. PRESS, Mar. 12, 1928, at 30.
202. Id.
203. Vickers, supra note 125, at 459; Ruth Bryan Owen To Take 36 Young Folks to Capital from
18 Florida Counties, EVE. INDEP. (St. Petersburg), Mar. 18, 1930, at 1.
204. Treva H. Shafto, Ruth Bryan Owen Delights Clubwomen with Lecture, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1929, at 7. A Jacksonville Journal editor swooned: Owen, a "stalwart, wise, beautiful,
magnetic woman . . . shines like the creature of cleanliness and light she is." VICKERS, supra note 141,
at 83.
205. Bryan's Daughter, supra note 160.
206. See supra Section I.A.
207. Mrs. Ruth Owen To Enter Race for Congress, MIAMI NEWS, Apr. 8, 1926, at 1. Not even a
year had elapsed since her naturalization on April 27, 1925.
Rice 23
23
Rice: The Riddle of Ruth Bryan Owen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
newspaper editor contacted her with sad tidings: Article XVI, Section 20
of the Florida Constitution rendered her ineligible to serve in Congress,
because she hadn't "been . .. ten years a citizen of the United States."20 8
Owen immediately called on James M. Carson, a prominent Miami
attorney and close confidant, to investigate this inauspicious claim.209
Carson and a team of Jacksonville attorneys "agreed unanimously upon
an opinion . . . that she could be seated if elected." 2 10 Carson dismissed
Section 20 as unconstitutional, 2" focusing instead on the federal
Qualifications Clause. He published an expanded version of his legal
opinion in the Miami News on April 14,212 the first public defense of
Owen's congressional eligibility. Carson appealed to the letter of the
Qualifications Clause, its underlying purposes, and the perversity of
wielding the now-unconstitutional Expatriation Act as a sword against
mistreated female candidates.
First, Owen had undeniably been a U.S. citizen for at least twenty-five
years of her life. If the Framers had meant to say "the seven years
immediately next preceding" an election, they could have.2 13 Second, the
provision's goal was to prevent foreign-born political aspirants from
holding office until they had been sufficiently schooled in American
principles. "[N]obody has ever questioned [Owen's] Americanism," of
course; nor had the Framers contemplated women's suffrage or the
congressional enumeration of individual expatriable acts.214 (This last
point clashes with Carson's assertion that the Philadelphia delegates knew
exactly what they were doing when they wrote "seven years" instead of
''seven years immediately next preceding.'')
But Carson had a subtler and more powerful constitutional argument,
one that drew upon history everyone could remember. The Nineteenth
Amendment's sweeping subtext had been instantiated in the Cable Act,
which governed "the very facts involved in this case" by "repeal[ing] the
harsh law theretofore in existence . .. on the ground that it was unjust to
208. Carson, supra note 149. This provision purported to forbid state officials from issuing
certificates of election to anyone "who has not been five years a citizen of the State and ten years a
citizen of the United States." FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVI, § 20.
209. Carson, supra note 149; Seeks Congress Seat, supra note 185.
210. Carson, supra note 149.
211. Id After all, "the provisions of the constitution of the state of Florida are not controlling
where in any manner they are contradicted by the provisions of the constitution of the United States."
Id. Carson cited several examples of governors deliberately disregarding analogous state constitutional
provisions. Id. At the Elections Committee hearing, Lawson's lawyer conceded that Section 20 "avails
nothing here, because it would be in conflict with the Federal Constitution and of no consequence."
Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 2. Justice Stevens might have deployed this evidence to preempt and
weaken the dissenters' "state practice" arguments in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, which held
that states cannot supplement the Qualifications Clauses' three requirements for federal legislative
officeholding. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995); see id. at 904-14
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing early state election laws in denying the federal Qualifications Clauses'
exclusivity).
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American women. "215 It would be no less absurd for the House to exclude
Owen because of this "TECHNICAL SO-CALLED POINT" than it would
be for the state to convict someone for violating a repealed law. 216
For extra assurance, Owen took a written statement of her case to a
Jacksonville law firm, which rendered "an unequivocal statement of [her]
eligibility." 2 17  Another group of volunteer Jacksonville attorneys2 18
furnished a critical insight: Section 4 of the Cable Act meant nothing
unless naturalization by its terms restored a woman's citizenship "as fully
as if she had not lost it." 219 Owen's reacquisition of citizenship was
therefore "as complete as if the citizenship had never been lost." 220
Owen later told the Elections Committee that she had "consulted
authorities in two cities, men of the highest integrity and reputation for
knowledge in the law." 221 Their written assessments were "placed at the
disposal of the public" through publication in Florida newspapers. 2 2
Owen also took out quarter-page advertisements that confidently assured
readers, "SHE WILL BE SEATED." 22 3  In 1926, Owen's Democratic
opponent had repeatedly cited her marriage to a foreigner to try to
delegitimize her candidacy.224 Carson's preemptive assistance largely
silenced these voices. 225 Her narrow defeat postponed a final resolution of
the question.
Once Owen won the 1928 Democratic primary, Republican candidate
William Lawson revived the old citizenship charge in an effort to swipe
votes from her. His campaign distributed thousands of circulars
throughout the Fourth District, excerpting a partial assortment of relevant
provisions (but not Section 4 of the Cable Act) and inviting voters to
"draw their own conclusions." 226
Owen frequently addressed her citizenship status on the hustings.227 But
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 48. Owen characterized the firm as one "of high repute in
the State of Florida." Id.
218. As Owen told the Elections Committee, "Later a number of other lawyers offered to give me
their own statements on this matter, a group of lawyers in Jacksonville, Fla. . . . . They voluntarily
offered to investigate this matter." Id.
219. Id. at 52.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 48. Noah Bainum, Lawson's attorney, spoke of Carson as "a lawyer of good
reputation." Id. at 52.
222. Id. at 48.
223. See, e.g., She Will Be Seated, MIAMI NEWS, June 7, 1926, at 8. This particular leaflet quoted
Section 4 of the Cable Act in full.
224. WRIGHT, supra note 124, at 74.
225. See Vickers, supra note 125, at 455 (observing that in 1926, "Owen's offensive strategy
deflected any potential controversy").
226. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 15-16. Owen called this document a "campaign dodger"
that was "in no way a legal document," "signed by no lawyer," and riddled with "inaccuracies." Id. at
49-50.
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she thought it unnecessary to distribute Carson's statement as aggressively
as in 1926, since "the whole attitude of the district was one of accepting
my eligibility, except for an occasional attempt to stir up the question." 228
Instead, the Owen campaign kept copies handy and released them
individually as inquiries arose. 229 Owen testified that "[i]n a large number"
of her district's ninety newspapers, "there was mention editorially of the
fact that I was eligible." 23 0
After losing the general election, Lawson boldly declared that he should
be declared "the duly elected and qualified member of Congress" from
Florida's Fourth District.231 Owen's supporters, he maintained, had
"wantonly misapplied" their votes, choosing a candidate they knew to be
ineligible and thus "dead in the eye of the law."232 Lawson also produced a
witness who insisted that the Fourth District universally rejected Owen's
exposition of her congressional qualifications.233
Predictably, the Elections Committee ultimately reasserted the House's
prerogative to judge its members' qualifications in the face of Lawson's
preclusive opinion-shaping strategy. Even if all 67,130 Owen voters had
believed she was as eligible as the man in the moon, "Neither Mrs.
Owen's attorneys nor the people of Florida had authority to determine the
question of citizenship involved." 234 Her ineligibility was but a hypothesis;
only through congressional action could her status "be removed from the
realm of mere contention and established in fact." 235 The House would
confront Lawson v. Owen's substantive legal issues head-on.
B. The Life of Lawson v. Owen
1. Governor Martin Abstains (Dec. 1928)
William Lawson conceded Owen's House election on November 6,
1928.236 But on November 28, a Daytona Beach law firm notified
Governor John W. Martin that Lawson would contest Owen's right to
228. Id. at 63.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 49.
231. Contested Election Case of William C. Lawson v. Ruth Bryan Owen: Statement, Brief and
Argument on Behalf of Contestant, 71st Cong. 16 (1930) [hereinafter Lawson Brie].
232. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 7, 10. Lawson analogized Owen's situation to that of a
recently deceased candidate whom voters knew to have died but elected anyway. It was as if she were
"21 years of age" or "not a resident of the State from which she w[as] elected." Id. at 7.
233. Said that witness, Luther Ferguson, "It was generally discussed over the district that she was
not eligible because she had not been a citizen long enough-for a period of seven years. . . . The fact
that she was considered ineligible was known to most everyone in the fourth district keeping up with
politics." Id. at 15-16.
234. William C. Lawson-Ruth Bryan Owen Election Case, H.R. Rep. No. 71-968, at 5 (1930)
[hereinafter Owen Report].
235. Id
236. Bryan's Daughter Sent to Congress by Florida, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 7, 1928, at 1.
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sit.237 Attorneys Noah Bainum and Lawrence Sherman (a former U.S.
senator) pointed Governor Martin to Article XVI, Section 20 of the
Florida Constitution.238  This provision purported to forbid Florida's
governor from certifying the election of any congressional candidate "who
has not been . .. ten years a citizen of the United States."2 39 Moreover,
Owen was ineligible to serve in the House under the U.S. Constitution,
having been a citizen only since her naturalization in 1925.240 Perhaps
Governor Martin himself would act unconstitutionally by issuing Owen's
certificate of election.
Martin, though a Republican, would have none of this. With hard-boiled
simplicity, he announced, "The people of the fourth district of Florida
elected Mrs. Owen and I am going to issue her a certificate."24 ' Owen
spoke even less elliptically. She told an audience that Lawson's challenge
must be a "joke," since Section 4 of the Cable Act had ripped the reviled
expatriation law from the annals of American history.24 2 She again
"laughed at" Lawson's action during an interview in mid-December.
243
"[W]hat sense would there have been [in] my running for Congress" with
a tarnished citizenship record? 2" Lawson's stunt was an "absurdity . .. not
worth taking seriously." 245  Owen telegraphed Governor Martin her
thanks.246
Lawson had lost the election, and he lost round one of his improbable
legal challenge. But he vowed to persist in what he publicly regarded as a
rare opportunity to serve his country. After extensive research at the
Department of Labor, Lawson concluded (somewhat correctly) that this
contest was "without precedent in the history of the United States." 247 He,
237. G.O.P. Contests Congress Seat, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29, 1928, at 1 [hereinafter
G.O.P. Contests].
238. Id.
239. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVI, § 20. This provision was probably doubly unconstitutional,
both for curbing democratic choice beyond the Qualifications Clauses' strictures, see U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995), and for requiring the governor to make
independent, potentially unreviewable Qualifications Clause determinations. No occasion can arise for
the House to judge a member-elect's contested eligibility if state officials refuse to certify the
candidate's election.
240. G.O.P. Contests, supra note 237.
241. Id. Martin did so on December 20. Certificate of Election, Lawson v. Owen, National
Archives, Center for Legislative Archives, HR71A-F9.2 (1928). H. Clay Crawford, Florida's Secretary
of State, had certified the results (67,130 votes for Owen, 36,288 for Lawson) on December 7.
Certificate of Secretary of State Announcing Results of Election in Fourth Congressional District,
Lawson v. Owen, National Archives, Center for Legislative Archives, HR71A-F9.2 (1928).
242. To Appeal on Mrs. Owen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1928, at 22.
243. Bryan's Daughter on Her Own, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1928, at 1.
244. Id.
245. Mrs. Owen Pokes Fun at Election Contest, ATL. CONST., Nov. 30, 1928, at 7.
246. Id.
247. Florida Woman Faces Election Victory Contest, EVE. INDEP. (St. Petersburg), Nov. 29,
1928, at 2 [hereinafter Florida Woman]. It was unprecedented in that no losing candidate had ever
asked either chamber to adopt the "cumulative" or "immediately preceding" theory of American
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too, praised Owen as a paragon of American values. But he worried that
seating someone three years removed from alienage would "set a
dangerous precedent . .. in case some undesirable person was elected." 248
Even an unsuccessful challenge would illuminate "what construction the
congress would place on that provision" requiring seven years'
citizenship. 24 9 Or so one might suppose.
2. The House Embraces Owen (Apr. 1929-Jan. 1930)
The House received Lawson v. Owen testimony in early April 1929.250
But no one was in a hurry to decide her case. As April's special
congressional session was set to begin, the House Rules Committee
changed the institution's protocol for handling contested elections. To
allow the House to concentrate on more-pressing issues, elections
committees would not organize until the regular December session.251
Candidates with properly authenticated certificates of election would take
the oath of office and sit provisionally as full members.2 52 Owen was
accordingly sworn in on April 15.253 Constitutionally eligible or not, she
would hold her title undisturbed until at least January 1930.
Congressmen had greeted Owen with a "standing ovation" when she
paid a preparatory visit to the House chamber on February 19, 1929.254 As
one Florida newspaper described the scene, "Members on both sides of the
aisle, Democrats and Republicans alike, arose to their feet without a single
exception and vigorously applauded. Old-time observers about the capitol
were unable to recall a similar instance in recent congressional history." 255
By early March, she had "received an enthusiastic welcome from
Democrat members in the House" eager to enlist her eloquence in their
legislative causes.256
The adoration never abated. Owen "captivated Washington completely"
with her potent charm, high erudition, and sightly figure. 257  A
contemporary depicted her almost-comical celebrity:
[H]er male colleagues are daft about her, and she has been
248. Florida Woman, supra note 247.
249. Lawson Doesn't Seek Owen Seat, He Says, ATL. CONST., Jan. 13, 1929, at 2. Lawson
certainly had "ample incentive to enforce" this "governmental process provision[]." Bradley & Siegel,
supra note 36, at 1287.
250. Probably Defer House Contests, LEWISTON MORN. TRiB. (ID), Apr. 15, 1929, at 1.
251. C.J. Lilley, House Rules Are Changed, PITT. PRESS, Apr. 16, 1929, at 16.
252. Id. The Washington Post later deemed Owen a "full fledged member of the Seventy-first
Congress." Elisabeth Ellicott Poe, Hereditary Rule Grows in America, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1929, at
SM3.
253. 71 CONG. REC. 25 (1929).
254. MCIVER, supra note 139, at 121.
255. Id
256. Eight Women in 71st Congress Give "Feminine Bloc" New Power, NEW CASTLE NEWS
(PA), Apr. 12, 1929, at 29.
257. Gilfond, supra note 177, at 152.
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rushed like the most popular co-ed on a campus. Handsome
elderly boys of the Senate come over to the House floor to sit by
her side, and when she swings over to the higher chamber to
listen to a debate dozens of Senators leave their seats to shake
hands with her.. .. Patriots from all parts of the country request
their Congressmen to introduce them to her.258
When she spoke, the entire House, "usually a medley of noise and
confusion, listen[ed] attentively."25 9 Her Florida colleagues were firmly in
her camp.2 60 The House of Representatives would ultimately decide
Owen's political destiny, and it openly revered her.
Two months into the special session, Owen was "giving a perfectly
swell demonstration of how to be a good congressman."2 61 Her "unusual
amount of ability" and unrivaled constituent service created a memorable
impression,262 one suggesting a distinguished senatorial future.
263 When
Owen the Democrat requested a seat on the all-important Foreign Affairs
Committee, the Republican-dominated House created one for her.2 6 (She
was the first woman ever to hold this prestigious post.265 ) Amusingly, the
House deemed Owen perfectly suited for the foreign-affairs position for
the same reason that Congress had once annulled her citizenship: her
marriage to a foreigner.266
Owen continued her good-citizenship crusade as she awaited an
Elections Committee inquiry into her own citizenship. She queried of that
generation's excitement-seeking youth, "What could be more sensational
than being a citizen of the United States?"267 Owen longed for her
compatriots to construct a "worthy edifice of American citizenship" 268 and
258. Id.
259. New Congress Gets Up Steam, HAWARDEN INDEP. (IA), Apr. 25, 1929, at 2.
260. See Florida Woman Confident ofCongress Post, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 1929, at 1-
2 [hereinafter Florida Woman Confident] ("Behind Mrs. Owen stands the staunch body of Florida
delegates who are backing up the daughter of the 'great commoner' in her first important battle for
political prestige.").
261. Rodney Dutcher, Bryan's Daughter Making Good, TOLEDO NEWS-BEE, June 12, 1929, at 1.
She preferred not to be called "Congresswoman." As she explained, "No one says chairwoman. So
why make a distinction elsewhere?" Ruth Bryan Owen Plans Tour To Tell Voters About Congress,
READING EAGLE, June 15, 1929, at 9.
262. S. J. Woolf, A Woman's Voice in Foreign Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1930, at SM4.
263. See Dutcher, supra note 261 ("[T]here are a great many persons ... who expect that she will
at least some day step from the house to the senate.").
264. 72 CONG. REC. 544 (1929); Zihlman Course in D.C. in Doubt, THE SUN (Baltimore), Dec.
13, 1929, at 7.
265. Mrs. Owen Wins in House Fight To Retain Seat, ANNISTON STAR, Mar. 2, 1930, at 13
[hereinafter Wins in House Fight].
266. In explaining why the House valued Owen's international expertise, a New York Times
profile specifically mentioned that she had "married a British army officer" and thereafter amassed a
"war record ... which added tremendously to her understanding of foreign affairs." Douglas, supra
note 134.
267. Ruth Bryan Owen Has New Citizenship Idea, PITT. PRESS, Feb. 3, 1929, at S4.
268. Distinguished Daughter of One of Southern Illinois [sic] Greatest Sons Pays Tribute to
Clark, MT. VERNON REGISTER-NEWS (IL), May 27, 1929, at 50.
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for adolescents to internalize the habits of "real American citizenship."2 69
She presented an engraved copy of The American's Creed to every high-
school and college graduate in her district.27 0 In one newspaper's
estimation, "The study of citizenship and the instilling of the knowledge
and appreciation of it into the youth of today may be said to be the hobbies
of Mrs. Owen."2 7 '
Editorialists nationwide cheered for Owen as congressional elections
committees lay dormant. 272 "W.C. Lawson," the Montana Standard
barked, "will go down to history as a bad loser and a poor sport. The effort
to oust Mrs. Owen is based on an absolute technicality." 2 73 The Biloxi
Daily Herald extolled that "brilliant woman congressman from Florida-
whose American citizenship and seat in congress some mere man ... has
the effrontery to contest." 274 An Iowa journalist teased the "long-nosed
individuals who wield hammers in that [Republican] disorganization" for
"[h]aving nothing else to do for the moment." 275 The Lima News revealed
its own sympathies as it measured Owen's popular support:
Shall the Great Commoner's daughter be denied a seat in the
halls of congress because her dead husband was a subject of
Great Britain? A great swelling chorus of "no" has been
sweeping the nation. Thousands of women have come to Mrs.
Owen's defense, along with men of varied political faiths.27 6
As early as July 4, 1929, the Hawarden Independent reported that some
Elections Committee members privately believed that Owen possessed an
"unbeatable defense" (even if those congressmen wouldn't speak for
attribution).2 77 Other publications announced that she would likely
prevail.278 Owen, too, happily forecast her fate: "I await the verdict in the
calm and confident belief that I shall be confirmed in my right title to the
seat to which I was so decisively elected." 279
269. William Atherton Du Puy, "The Lady From Florida" Works Fast, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
1929, at SM7.
270. Woolf, supra note 262. Owen believed that "[s]urely there should be some gesture on the
part of the government when the duties of citizenship in school are exchanged for those of citizenship
in the nation." Id.
271. Owen, Congresswoman, supra note 179.
272. Considerable searching has turned up zero pro-Lawson opinion pieces at any point in the
process.
273. The Fight on Ruth Bryan Owen, MONTANA STAND., June 28, 1929, at 4; see also Mrs.
Owen's Citizenship, LINCOLN STAR, Dec. 4, 1928, at 12 (dismissing the "technicalities of the silly
statute which congress wiped off the books").
274. Flies, BILOXI DAILY HER., Dec. 13, 1929, at 4.
275. Braving Heat in Washington, HAWARDEN INDEP. (IA), July 4, 1929, at 1.
276. Cable Assists Mrs. Owen in Congress Fight, LIMA NEWS, July 5, 1929, at 14.
277. Braving Heat in Washington, supra note 275.
278. See, e.g., Walsh Busy on Tariff LOWELL SUN, Sept. 21, 1929, at 6 ("It is not expected,
however, that the claim of her contestant will be upheld. Mrs. Owen will probably retain her seat.").
279. Cable Assists, supra note 276; see also Florida Woman Confident, supra note 260 ("1 have
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Finally, on December 10, 1929, the Clerk laid Lawson v. Owen (and all
associated documents) before the House. 28 0 Speaker Nicholas Longworth
referred the case to House Elections Committee No. 1 two days later.281
Lawson would wage his well-watched battle alone: Florida Republican
National Committeeman Glenn B. Skipper made perfectly clear that
"[n]either the State Republican organization, myself as a national
committeeman, nor the national Republican organization is having
anything to do with this contest, nor will we." 282 Even the 1928
Republican platform had championed "whole-heartedly equality on the
part of women." 283
3. Elections Committee No. 1 Hears Owen's Case (Jan. 17-18, 1930)
The Elections Committee finally convened its Lawson v. Owen hearings
in a "stuffy little committee room" 284 at 10 A.M. on Friday, January 17,
1930,285 thirteen months after Lawson drew up his notice of contest. Owen
had labored for nine months as the Fourth District's "prima facie"
congresswoman.
Lawrence Sherman, Noah Bainum, and Edward Clifford presented
Lawson's legal case in a brief submitted to the Elections Committee.286
Bainum and another lawyer, H. B. Morrow, fielded questions from the
Committee. Owen wrote her own brief28 7 and chose not to hire a seasoned
oral advocate, "because, to me, the elements we are considering are so
simple that they do not require any legal presentation. "288 (Not that a
Chautauqua legend and speech professor needed any oratorical
reinforcement; she published Elements of Public Speaking289 one year
absolute confidence in my right to occupy the seat to which I have been elected. I have no doubt that
the committee of the house of representatives which passes on the election contest will confirm my
right to the seat and dispose of the suggestion that there is any flaw in my eligibility.").
280. 72 CONG. REC. 572 (1929).
281. Congress, OGDEN STAND. EXAM. (UT), Dec. 13, 1929, at 2.
282. Opposes Florida Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1929, at 32.
283. Country Raised from Depths of Depression to Heights of Prosperity by G.O.P. Claim, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 15, 1928, at 4. The 1928 Democratic platform had also advocated "equality
of women with men in all political and governmental matters." 72 CONG. REC. 9317 (1930).
284. Kenneth G. Crawford, Ruth Bryan Owen Appeals in Person for Recognition as Florida
Congresswoman, ATL. CONST., Jan. 19, 1930, at 13A.
285. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 1.
286. Lawson Brief, supra note 231, at 1.
287. As far as I know, no copy of Owen's brief survives. Lawson's may be found in the papers of
Elections Committee No. 1, Seventy-first Congress, at the National Archives. Owen's is strangely
missing from the file. On March 6, 1930, the Clerk of the House wrote the following letter to a Senate
employee who had requested a copy of Owen's brief: "I am extremely sorry I was unable to furnish
you with a copy of Mrs. Owen's brief. There were printed only sixty copies of the brief and our supply
of them was exhausted some time ago. Enclosed is a copy of the Hearings held in the Lawson-Owen
Case. Mrs. Owen's statement covers all the points made in her brief, much of it quoted directly from
it." Letter from William Tyler Page to Harry Davis (Mar. 6, 1930), National Archives, Center for
Legislative Archives, HR7IA-F9.2.
288. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 47. So confident was Owen that she told Chairman Beedy,
"I do not propose to take more than five minutes myself." Id. at 35.
289. RUTH BRYAN OWEN, ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC SPEAKING (1931).
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later.) Spectators filled the room to witness Owen's historic
performance.2 90
As the proceedings began, Chairman Carroll Beedy pledged "to conduct
this hearing just as though it were a law case." 291 But the Committee's
nine members had never encountered a "profound constitutional
question" 292 quite like this one.
a. Lawson's Argument
Noah Bainum began by assuring the Committee that he approached
Lawson v. Owen "without any personal feeling in the matter, or without
any political view of the situation." 2 93 He focused "purely [on] the
construction of the constitutional provision."294 Bainum's gentlemanly
disclaimer ironically foreshadowed the failure of Lawson's legal team to
offer any persuasive counter-account of a critical statutory provision:
Section 4 of the Cable Act.
Bainum surprised the Committee by arguing that Owen's first twenty-
four years of American citizenship-not just the middle fifteen-had been
"wiped out" when she married a foreigner. 2 95 "Once a Britisher always a
Britisher until naturalized," he chanted.29 6 (Why this logic didn't also
apply to Owen's resumed American citizenship, Bainum failed to
explain.) Chairman Beedy asked Bainum how he would respond as a
witness if asked whether Owen "had been at any time" a U.S. citizen for
seven years. Bainum would say she had been, but he adamantly denied
that she had "been seven Years a Citizen of the United States." 2 97 "Why
do you want us to add those words to the Constitution," Beedy groaned? 298
"Because unless you do you would not be adhering to the Constitution."29 9
"Your Constitution, then, is different from mine." 300
As this exchange suggests, Lawson's brief contended that the
Qualifications Clause refers to the immediately prior seven years as a
continuous unit. Why? Because the language "who shall not have ... been
290. Right to House Seat Pleaded by Mrs. Owen, THE SUN (Baltimore), Jan. 19, 1930, at I
(describing the "crowded committee room"). Owen's defense of her own congressional eligibility calls
to mind Augustus Garland's self-representation in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866), which
concerned the constitutionality of a statute forbidding former Confederate officials (Garland included)
from appearing in the courts of the United States.
291. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 35.
292. Id. at 42.
293. Id at 1.
294. Id.; see id at 42 ("We do not view this as a party or political question at all. There is no
Republicanism, there is no Democracy, in it.").
295. Id. at 26.
296. Id. at 23; see id. at 26 ("THE CHAIRMAN. But by that marriage she was robbed of the
citizenship of 24 years which she had theretofore enjoyed? MR. BAINUM. Yes, sir."). I suppose Owen
would have been forever ineligible to the presidency under this theory.
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seven Years" should be read to require that Representatives "shall have
been" citizens for seven years.30' From this commonsense deduction, and
with no further explanation, Lawson asked the Committee to infer that
Article I's citizenship requirement "relate[s] to seven continuous years
before the member's election."302 Bainum analogized the seven-year
requirement to a statute of limitations that "can not work two years now
and two years after a while. . . . This statutory period of seven years must
be an entirety."303 And it had begun to run on April 27, 1925, the day
Owen was naturalized. 30 She wouldn't be eligible until April 27, 1932.
Bainum believed he'd won the big statutory battle by establishing that
Section 3 of the Cable ACt305 wasn't retroactive. 306 Hardly so. In a
remarkable failure of lawyering, both Bainum and Morrow betrayed a
complete ignorance of Section 4 of the Act. Neither had even read Owen's
written brief-filed at least nine days earlier3 07-before arguing Lawson's
case to the Elections Committee.308 Perhaps the Committee forgot to
deliver a copy to Lawson's attorneys, but the duo greatly disserved their
client by agreeing to argue Lawson v. Owen without having seen the
opposing brief. Procedural glitches aside, there can be no extenuating their
failure to read every word of the one-page Cable Act. Owen's "She Will
Be Seated" advertisements had even quoted Section 4 in full. 309 Minimal
research could have anticipated this strategy.
The hearing's first Section 4 question caught Bainum badly off guard. "I
do not seem to have that [provision]," he shrugged. "Have you got it?" 310
Sticking to the script, Bainum assured the Committee that "there is
nothing retroactive about [Section 4] at all.""31  That provision's entire
point, though, was to edit an expatriated woman's past citizenship record
once she became naturalized. Yet Bainum continued believing that quicker
301. Lawson Brief supra note 231, at 12.
302. Id
303. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 28.
304. Id. at 25.
305. "[A] woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the United States
by reason of her marriage after the passage of this Act." Cable Act of 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021
(1922).
306. As Bainum explained, "assuming ... the act was retroactive, there would be no occasion for
Mrs. Owen to be naturalized." Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 22. Bainum argued the
nonretroactivity point repeatedly even though no one contested it. Id. at 20-21. Perhaps he missed
Section 7, which did the work for him: "Section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 is repealed. Such
repeal shall not restore citizenship lost under such section." § 7, 42 Stat. 1021.
307. See Hearing Saturday in Move To Oust Ruth Bryan Owen, EVE. INDEP. (St. Petersburg), Jan.
9, 1930, at 25 (reporting that Owen had "filed her own brief"). Lawson had also submitted his brief by
January 9. See id. (referring to Lawson's "brief filed with the committee").
308. Bainum was cornered into admitting that "I have not seen Mrs. Owen's brief. I shall be very
glad to have one and study it." Id. at 29. I assume that if Bainum hadn't seen Owen's brief, neither had
Morrow, who played a subsidiary role. But Owen had examined Lawson's. During her oral argument,
Owen observed that "[i]n his brief contestant quotes liberally the expatriation act of 1907." Id. at 54.
309. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.




Rice: The Riddle of Ruth Bryan Owen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
naturalization procedures were "[t]he only privileges which Congress
extended to such women."312 When Chairman Beedy read Sections 3 and
4 together to suggest that Owen had always been a citizen in the eyes of
the law, Bainum denied the legitimacy of this simple syllogistic exercise:
"No. You are reading that into the statute. It does not say that." 313 Rather,
Owen enjoyed only those rights conferred on naturalized citizens of
foreign birth.314
Morrow fared no better. He emphatically denied that any part of the
Cable Act "restore[d] citizenship." " As far as the Committee should be
concerned, Owen "became a citizen for the first time ... when she was
naturalized in 1925.",316 Beedy reiterated his holistic reading of Sections 3
and 4. An American-born woman who had never ceased to be a citizen
had always been a citizen, right? Morrow was trapped. "Answering your
question, Mr. Chairman, I would say yes; but I do not think the law means
that."317
The law did mean that. As a purely interpretive matter, Section 4 plainly
purported to restore the lost citizenship of any qualifying woman who took
the trouble to become naturalized. Lawson's attorneys faltered on account
of their poor preparation and inability to make mid-course corrections. But
their oral obduracy contained the seeds of a potentially winning
constitutional theory: Congress could not validly rewrite the historical
record, overriding amply evidenced alienage.
Bainum and Morrow never labeled Section 4 unconstitutional, because
they didn't know what it said. But that conclusion followed naturally from
their rhetoric. By her own admission, Bainum pointed out, Owen had been
a British subject as late as April 1925.318 "There is no such thing as
restored citizenship,"3 19 which would entail an absurdity-that Owen was
an American when she applied for American citizenship. The record
showed that she re-entered America as an alien, Morrow reminded the
Committee. "If that does not constitute a foreigner, I do not know what, in
law, would be a foreigner."3 20 Congress "could not ... change [Owen's]
citizenship status, a substantive thing in the law." 321
A few Committee members indulged their purposivist inklings.
312. Id. at 24.
313. Id. at 41.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 36.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 39.
318. Owen had formally declared-in writing-her "intention to become a citizen of the United
States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, of
whom at this time I am a subject." Id. at 20.
319. Id. at 25.
320. Id. at 38.
321. Id. at 37. Her citizenship status until age twenty-four was apparently not "a substantive thing
in the law." Bainum had no trouble expunging that uncontested historical fact.
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Chairman Beedy shared "a thought": the Framers created a citizenship
qualification because "they did not want people coming here who had no
local knowledge of our institutions."3 22 Owen was technically stripped of
her citizenship, "a thing which the framers of the Constitution perhaps
never thought of or did not have in mind." 32 3 But she clearly satisfied the
Qualifications Clause's subsurface strictures. Why exclude her "simply on
the ground of a technicality"?3 24 The Framers were clearly "considering
the foreign born instead of the native bom."3 25 And to them, the
"foreigner" was an emigrant "coming here unfamiliar with American
institutions, and possibly not in sympathy with our form of
Government." 326 Hadn't Owen's earliest memories consisted of her
sympathizing with the American form of government?
Bainum and Morrow offered two responses. First, to maintain the
"dignity and solemnity of this constitutional provision,"3 27 the Committee
could not make Owen its special favorite. This case was an important test
for the rule of law: "[I]t would be an unfair thing for this committee to
apply to a person in Mrs. Owen's situation . .. a different rule than . . .
would be applied to any other foreigner." 328 With ordinary foreigners,
after all, the House would undoubtedly adopt Lawson's "immediately
preceding" interpretation. 329 But this response was fallacious on two
levels. The House wouldn't consciously adopt the "immediately
preceding" view in the case of a foreign-born alien; it wouldn't need to
pick a precise approach, just as the Framers didn't. And if Owen's
"cumulative" view were correct, the principle of equal treatment 330 would
require its application across the board (even if that choice wouldn't affect
most contested-citizenship cases).
Second, Lawson's attorneys insisted that the "cumulative"
interpretation's consequences would be intolerable. American women
taking foreign husbands normally "acquir[ed] so many bad habits that the
limitation ought to be absolute," "perpetual."33 1 Notwithstanding Owen's
exquisite qualities, Morrow warned of American women marrying aliens,
"going abroad and staying there a long period of time, and becoming
completely out of touch with the American viewpoint, American
322. Id. at 33.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 37.
326. Id. at 38.
327. Id. at 42.
328. Id. at 41.
329. Id. at 42.
330. Bainum insisted that "you have got to apply this Constitution regardless of whether it is Mrs.
Owen or somebody else." Id. at 33. Chairman Beedy agreed: "Exactly. We ought not to use her name
in the case at all." Id.
331. Id. at 32, 34.
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principles, and American customs." 332 The Qualifications Clause should
therefore be read to subject recovering expatriates to a long and
continuous probationary period in which to discard their
"entanglements." 33
The Committee adjourned three hours after it began, and reconvened the
next morning to complete hearings in "Mrs. Owen's case."3 34 Chairman
Beedy thanked Bainum for his efforts and initiated the hearing's most
anticipated phase: "Mrs. Owen, the committee will be very glad to hear
you." 335
b. Owen's Argument
Owen first thanked opposing counsel for proceeding without any
"personal animus" or "political partisanship."336 She confidently asserted
that "the laws of my native country, exactly as the laws are written,"
entitled her to a seat in Congress. 3 37 Then, "[w]ith her hands behind her,
and her body braced against a bookshelf," 338 Ruth Bryan Owen argued her
case to the Elections Committee and to newspaper readers nationwide. 339
Owen pounced on Lawson's failure, "for obvious reasons,"340 to
mention Section 4 in his brief (and during oral argument). She quoted
Congressman Cable's own analysis of the law: "[N]aturalization
obliterates her foreign-citizenship status, and she stands, by virtue of such
naturalization, as one who has always been a citizen of the United
States." 341 Reading Sections 3 and 4 in conjunction made this an
exceedingly easy case. As Owen saw it, Congress had wiped out every
trace of "my involuntary expatriation because of a law now no longer
valid." 342 Owen had "never by word or act," or by act of Congress, "been
anything but a loyal American citizen during my entire life." 343
But she cared far less about the "letter" of the law than its "spirit." 344 In
a powerful culmination of Carson's early efforts, Owen viewed her
present struggle against the backdrop of America's newly purified
constitutional commitments:
332. Id. at 38.
3 3 3. Id.
334. Id at 42. This quote is from Chairman Beedy, who, interestingly, chose to use Owen's name
as shorthand for the contest's full name.
335. Id. at 47.
336. Id
337. Id.
338. Bryan's Daughter Pleads Own Case for Congress Seat, BILOXI DAILY HER., Jan. 18, 1930,
at 1.
339. See Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 56 ("The CHAIRMAN. Are there any press reporters
here? (There were four newspaper reporters present.)").
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No man ever lost his citizenship through his marriage. If on the
same day that I married Major Owen an American man had
married a woman from another country, he would not have had
five minutes of loss of citizenship. The last thing that is done to
[a] man who has disqualified himself in the eyes of his
Government as a citizen, the last punishment that is ever
inflicted on a man is the deprivation of citizenship. The traitor,
the felon, the lowest criminal, is deprived of his citizenship, and
yet by the enactment of my country I was deprived of my
citizenship for no fault of my own ... but because I was a
woman.
345
There was "no better time and place" than the House Elections Committee
to accord women "the same dignity and individuality of citizenship which
is enjoyed by the male citizen." 346
Owen spoke tenderly of her war service, and of the many personal
comforts she had relinquished on her cyclical quests to feed and clothe six
human beings.347 Were these the "vicious habits which American women
might bring back"? 348 Owen's voice "dropped almost to a whisper" as she
eulogized her departed husband.3 49 His gallant spirit transcended the
inevitable death he first tasted in Turkish trenches. Everyone knew how
ably Ruth had aided the Allied cause on British soil; now, she proudly
boasted of having "conferred a favor upon my adopted State in bringing to
them so beloved and so honored a citizen," the late Reginald Altham
Owen.350 If American law penalized this marriage, "I want to bear that
penalty, as I bear my husband's name, very proudly."3 5 And after stealing
her citizenship, the government had made it impossible for Owen to
petition for naturalization without losing her Chautauqua lecture fees, the
family's only income. 352 "If the consideration of my case is going to make
more clear the laws which have dealt unjustly with women," she decided,
"I welcome this case." 353
Almost as an afterthought, Owen dutifully discussed the Qualifications
Clause.354 The Committee's odd interpretive dilemma posed a false
345. Id. at 54-55; see id. at 59 ("[N]o American man has ever been called before a committee of
this sort to explain his marriage.").
346. Id. at 55.
347. Id. at 56-58.
348. Id. at 58.
349. Crawford, supra note 284.
350. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 59.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 58.
353. Id. at 58-59.
354. See id. at 59 ("[E]ven if you find that you are unable to justify yourself in agreeing with the
intent of the framer of the Cable Act, then I refer you to the Constitution.").
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choice: the seven-year provision was "definite."355 Owen detected
"nothing equivocal, gentlemen, about the wording of the Constitution."356
It simply required seven years of citizenship. Any other stance would
"qualifly]" the Framers' careful word choice and insert extraneous
language into the Constitution. 357 Owen had therefore "been seven Years a
Citizen" many times over, regardless of how one parsed the Cable Act.358
Nor was there anything equivocal about the reasons for adding a
citizenship requirement. The point, she thought everyone agreed, was to
exclude those "who have not lived here sufficiently long to be safe
guardians of our institutions" through "sufficient background and
knowledge."3 59 Owen dared the Committee to deny that someone with her
"American background" would be "a safe interpreter of the laws and
institutions of our country." 360
At bottom, though, this wasn't a fight over the arcane incidents of
legislative qualifications. It was about equality. Owen posed the question
starkly: Would the House secure to the American woman "her right to the
same consideration at the hands of her Government as is enjoyed by the
male citizen"?3 6 1 Lawson v. Owen "hinges upon the attitude of my
Government toward its women citizens."362 A new constitutional day had
dawned. At this aurora of full citizenship equality, Congress must
vindicate "the right of an American woman before the eyes of her
Government to exactly the same treatment that is meted out to a man." 363
In other words, equal protection of the laws.
"With intense feeling," 364 Owen held forth for over an hour.365 A
Montana newspaper reckoned her appeal "[o]ne of the most dramatic and
affecting pleas ever made before a government tribunal."3 66 When she
finished, Chairman Beedy declared the hearings closed, and House
Elections Committee No. 1 went into executive session.367
355. Id.
356. Id. at 60.
357. Id. at 60-61. Chairman Beedy seemed to have been leaning this way the day before: "If, as
lawyers, we are taught to believe that if a statute is retroactive it should say so . . . why, if this
provision of the Constitution intended to prescribe that [the] limitation of the seven years should be
next preceding the year of the election, should it not also state that too?" Id. at 27.
358. Forty-four years "[i]f you accept the intent of the framer of the Cable Act," and twenty-nine
otherwise. Id. at 61.
359. Id. at 60.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 61.
362. Id.
363. Id
364. Mrs. Owen Upholds Election Legality, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1930, at 4.
365. Crawford, supra note 284.
366. The Commoner's Daughter, MONTANA STAND., Jan. 24, 1930, at 6.
367. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 64.
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4. Waiting for an Answer (Jan. 18-Mar. 24, 1930)
Owen's address to the Elections Committee had made her "the most
talked-of woman in the United States." 368 This burst of attention "brought
her a flood of commending communications," from men as well as
women.369 "[M]any throughout the land" hoped and expected that the
Elections Committee would unreservedly endorse Owen's eligibility. 370
One newspaper branded Lawson a "poor loser." 371' He was "squarely
beaten," his Qualifications Clause challenge "mean in spirit."372 Lawson's
unmanly move should "meet with disaster"373-nOt just because of
Owen's sterling credentials, but because his "pettifogging" 37 dignified a
law that had discriminated against a class of equal American citizens.
Lawson's ploy was a "hang-over from a bad law," 375 the "officious and
unjust"376 Expatriation Act. Lawson v. Owen presented an elemental
question of political justice: "whether in the general application of the law
the government will discriminate against women." 377 If constitutional
fidelity mandated present-day sex discrimination, "The law is an ass!" 37 8
Newspaper editors also agreed that excluding Owen would be utterly
pointless. She was "[b]om in America, raised in America, always an
American."3 79 William Jennings Bryan's daughter was "100 per cent an
American, "380 a "mighty fine American girl." 38 1 No one was more
"American from head to foot." 38 2 If it seated Lawson, the House would
commit a "rigid literalism" in the application of rule-like legal
provisions.38  Even if the Qualifications Clause seemed to bar her, Owen's
368. A Widow Fights for Her Rights, LETHBRIDGE HER. (Alberta), Feb. 1, 1930, at 10 [hereinafter
Widow Fights].
369. C.O. Smith, Law Covering Nationality Is Attacked, CALGARY DAILY HER., Jan. 28, 1930, at
2. A few days after the committee hearings, the Ludington Daily News accurately predicted that Owen
"will have the sympathy of the American people." Owen 's Case, supra note 51.
370. The Commoner's Daughter, supra note 366.
371. Owen's Case, supra note 51.
372. Id. After all, "a large majority of the people of [Florida's Fourth District] said by their vote
that they wanted Ruth Bryan Owen as their congresswoman." Mere Technical Objection, OELWEIN
DAILY REG. (IA), Jan. 23, 1930, at 2. Lawson was therefore seeking Owen's "justly earned seat in
Congress." An Absurd Situation, SUNDAY MORN. STAR (Wilmington, DE), Jan. 26, 1930, at 7. One
editorial even considered Lawson's legal argument a fundamentally sexist "subterfuge." Ruth Bryan's
Citizenship, SANTA ANA REGISTER, Jan. 22, 1930, at 18.
373. An Absurd Situation, supra note 372.
374. Id.
375. Smith, supra note 369.
376. Cole, supra note 49.
377. Smith, supra note 369.
378. Absurd Situation, supra note 372.
379. The Commoner's Daughter, supra note 366.
380. Owen's Case, supra note 51.
381. Mere Technical Objection, supra note 372.
382. An Absurd Situation, supra note 372. Indeed, "one would have to hunt pretty far to find a
more thorough-going American than Mrs. Owen." Mrs. Owen Should Remain, OAKLAND TRIB., Jan.
25, 1930, at 24.
383. Mrs. Owen's Citizenship, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 28, 1930, at 4.
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was an "exceptional case[]."384 Here was someone who could have run for
Congress on her wedding day, and who had only grown stronger, wiser,
and more quintessentially American since. The combined force of her
Section 4 and seven-year arguments "ought to satisfy the most inexorable
constitutional pedants, sticklers and purists." 385
The Elections Committee held an executive session on January 27,
1930.386 It made no real headway on Owen's case. Chairman Beedy
released a statement that "the questions in the case are so complex that
they will require considerable study. It will require several meetings of the
committee before all the points involved can be gone into." 8 The
Committee adjourned again on February 22 with nothing final to
announce-it was "still studying the constitutional and statutory
provisions dealing with the case." 38 8 As she awaited the Committee's
decision on her citizenship status, Owen was specially chosen to deliver an
homage to the American flag as part of a radio series designed to inspire
patriotism. 389
Her wait ended on March 1. After an all-day conference, the Elections
Committee unanimously agreed to recommend Owen's seating.390
Chairman Beedy revealed nothing about the Committee's report, because
it hadn't been written yet. He merely shared his colleagues' bottom line-
unanimity as to the outcome. 39 1 Owen expressed relief at this long-
expected deliverance: "I am very happy that the Committee has decided in
my favor, and I am exceptionally pleased that the decision was
unanimous." 392
As always, the print media celebrated with her. The Washington Post
considered Chairman Beedy's announcement a historic "victory for
women who are seeking to remove legal discriminations against their
sex." 393 Another newspaper thought the decision "courteous, sensible and
just," the "gentlemanly thing to do." 394 The Committee's decision had a
"firm foundation in common sense" and would be "applauded by both
Republicans and Democrats alike." 395 No one ever doubted Owen's
384. Id.
385. Owen's Case, supra note 51.
386. No Decision Reached in Mrs. Owen's Case, SARASOTA HER.-TRIB., Jan. 27, 1930, at 4.
387. Id.
388. No Action in Election Case of Mrs. Owen, EVE. INDEP. (St. Petersburg), Feb. 24, 1930, at 9.
389. Listeners To Salute Flag as Curtis Leads in Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1930, at 123.
390. Wins in House Fight, supra note 265.
391. Vote To Seat Mrs. Owen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1930, at 25 [hereinafter Vote to Seat].
392. Mrs. Owen Wins, IRONWOOD TIMES (MI), Mar. 14, 1930, at 4.
393. Mrs. Owen's Victory, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1930, at 6; see also id. ("This is a sensible
construction of the law. The effect of that untenable arrangement under which an American woman
became an Englishwoman though a marriage contract should not be perpetuated, now that the measure
has been supplanted.").
394. Sensible and Just, ZANESVILLE TIMES RECORDER (OH), Mar. 6, 1930, at 4.
395. A Common Sense Decision, CARROLL DAILY HER. (IA), Mar. 10, 1930, at 2. After all, the
"[a]ction to bar her ... never had more than a flimsy technical basis." Ignoring a Foolish Quibble,
SCRANTON REP., Mar. 7, 1930, at 8.
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"American citizenship in the broad and only important sense of the
term"; 396 her failed ouster "never did seem quite the sporting thing." 397
"[E]verybody" should applaud this felicitous outcome. 398
The Elections Committee met on March 8 and again on March 16 to
frame a final report, but each time the nine failed to resolve internal
differences. 399 On March 22, they simply stopped trying. After what
proved to be its last executive session, the Committee decided to submit
majority and minority reports to the House. These reasoned analyses
would "arrive at the same conclusion"-Owen's constitutional
eligibility-"but via different routes."400 Owen professed not to care how
many reports the Committee wrote, "[s]o long as the conclusions are the
same."401
Chairman Beedy submitted Report No. 968 to the House on March 24,
1930.402 Elections Committee No. 1 passed along its unanimous
"recommendation that William C. Lawson is not entitled to a seat and that
Ruth Bryan Owen is entitled to the seat from the fourth district of
Florida." 403 Busy congressmen could have been forgiven for failing to
recognize Lawson v. Owen as a novel, multidimensional constitutional
controversy. Reading Report No. 968 would have stirred them from their
detachment.
5. Reading the Elections Committee Report
The ten-page report opened with brisk summaries of "The Question
Involved," "The Facts," and "The Constitutional Provision and Federal
Laws Affecting the Case." 404 It then stated the crux of Lawson's
contention: even though Owen "is, and always has been, loyal to and
familiar with our American system of Government and American
institutions," the House should always insist upon a term of seven years'
citizenship immediately preceding an election.405 Otherwise, "a dangerous
precedent would be established" for the injection of "foreign influence in
the Federal Congress."4 06
The Committee forcefully booted Lawson's claim that Owen supporters
had squandered their votes, 407 but it splintered on the merits of his
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Mrs. Owen Wins, supra note 392.
399. Few Activities in Congress Today, ELYRIA CHRON. TELEG., Mar. 8, 1930, at 3; Day in
Congress, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1930, at 2.
400. Committee Splits over Owen Report, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1930, at 2.
401. Id.
402. 72 CONG. REC. 6050 (1930).
403. Id.
404. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 1-3.
405. Id. at 4.
406. Id.
407. See Section 11I.A supra.
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constitutional plea. A five-person majority 40 -all Republicans-found
Owen eligible "through a consideration of the constitutional provision
alone."4 09 They construed the seven-year provision to be "cumulative."410
When interpreting the Constitution, the majority advised, "the ordinary
meaning should be ascribed to its language.... [W]hen that meaning is
apparent on the face of the instrument," neither courts nor legislatures can
add to or subtract from it.411 Singing from Owen's songbook, these five
insisted that "if the framers had intended the seven years' citizenship to
have been limited to the seven years next preceding an election, they
would have said so." 4 12 Counting the time before her marriage and after
her naturalization, Owen had been a U.S. citizen for over twenty-eight
years when Florida's Fourth District elected her.413 She was therefore
quadruply eligible to serve in the House of Representatives.
The majority didn't explain why, if the Framers hadn't even foreseen
the problem of inconsecutive citizenship periods, they would have said
"immediately preceding" if they had meant it. And the majority failed to
engage with an even more devastating counterargument. If any seven
years' citizenship forever qualify their holders for House membership,
noncitizens may lawfully serve in Congress. By the "cumulative" view,
one could renounce his U.S. citizenship and spitefully serve his rebuffed
countrymen in the House of Representatives with no constitutional
difficulty. Given the Article I and II Qualifications Clauses' structural
consonance, the same would also be true of candidates for the Senate-
and even the presidency! We intuitively discredit these striking
conclusions because the Qualifications Clauses seem to have as their
bedrock objective the exclusion of aliens from federal legislative service.
Indeed, even Antifederalist scaremongers assumed that federal legislators
must actually be citizens.4 14 After nearly two centuries of constitutional
governance, the Supreme Court similarly insisted that "the right to govern
is reserved to citizens."415
408. The majority consisted of Representatives F. Dickinson Letts, Godfrey G. Goodwin, Charles
A. Kading, J. Lincoln Newhall, and Rowland L. Johnston. Chairman Beedy was a surprising omission,
given his overt skepticism of Lawson's "immediately preceding" theory. See supra note 357.
409. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 6.
410. Id
411. Id
412. Id "A review of the debates and proceedings of the Constitutional Convention" convinced
the majority that "the omissioncof words, such as the minority would read into the provision, was not a
matter of inadvertence." Id. at 9-10.
413. Id. at 6.
414. See, e.g., To the Members of the Convention of Massachusetts, supra note 56, at 185
("[A]fter seven years residence, will [foreigners] not be in your federal house of representatives, or
after nine years residence in your senate?").
415. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978); see id. at 295 (suggesting that aliens may
"participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking," whether at the federal or state level, only
after becoming naturalized citizens); id. at 296 ("[A] democratic society is ruled by its people."); id.
(alluding to the "choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen peers"). In fact, the
Court has unequivocally-even if unwittingly-countenanced the "immediately preceding" view. See
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During oral argument, Committee members acknowledged that their
chosen interpretation must apply equally to everyone.416 Well, one might
ask, would the ratifying generation have readily permitted erstwhile
Americans to run for Congress after internalizing the snobbish customs of
European capitals? What if native-born Ruth Bryan had instead married
Leon Trotsky and launched the Bolshevik Wives' War Relief Fund, then
returned to America, still married, seeking admission to Congress "for
insidious purposes"? 417 Since 1802, the naturalization laws have presumed
that aliens must live in the United States for at least five years to cast off
their inborn allegiances. 4 18 Why should a similar presumption not apply to
Americans who choose to make new lives abroad? The "oddity" (and
possible danger) of allowing aliens to make federal law for Americans
"should weigh against endorsing this method of declaring [candidates]
eligible."4 19
The four-person minority 420 espoused Lawson's view of the
Qualifications Clause-only seven years of citizenship "next preceding
the date of election" suffice. 421 But according to Congress, Owen had been
an American citizen her entire life. She became naturalized as specified by
Section 2 of the Cable Act, thereby acquiring "the same citizenship status
as if her marriage had taken place after the passage of this act." 4 22 Section
3 defined this status as that of someone who had "not cease[d] to be a
citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage."4 23
The minority correctly sensed that disagreement over Section 4
concerned congressional power as well as statutory interpretation. The
institution that could constitutionally424 strip Owen of her American
citizenship, the minority explained, "also had the power to pass a law
which set out the procedure by means of which she could recover her
American citizenship." 42 5 Moreover, the Cable Act should be expansively
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.10 (1952) (explaining that the Qualifications Clauses
"require that candidates for election to the House of Representatives and Senate be citizens")
(emphasis added). Justice Story agreed, insisting that "[njo person will deny the propriety of excluding
aliens from any share in the administration of the affairs of the national government." STORY, supra
note 55, § 75.
416. See supra note 330.
417. 2 RECORDS, supra note 53, at 216 (statement of George Mason).
418. Daniel Rice, The "Uniform Rule" and Its Exceptions: A History of Congressional
Naturalization Legislation, 40 OZARK HIST. REV. 23, 31 (2011).
419. Primus, supra note 19, at 1706 n.107. Primus offered short reflections on the "cumulative"
and "immediately preceding" interpretations in the course of imagining alternative justifications for
seating Hiram Revels. He tentatively rejected the "cumulative" approach on consequentialist grounds.
Id. at 1705-06.
420. The minority consisted of three Democrats (Edward E. Eslick, Robert S. Hall, and J. Bayard
Clark) and the Republican Chairman, Carroll Beedy.
421. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 6.
422. Id. at 7. The minority was quoting Section 4.
423. Id.
424. At least before the Nineteenth Amendment. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312
(1915) (upholding Section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1907).
425. Strictly speaking, the Naturalization Clause empowered Congress to specify the procedure
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interpreted "in the light of [the Nineteenth] [A]mendment as but another
step in extending the rights and privileges of American women. "426 it
should be "liberally construed as a measure intended to right an injustice"
inflicted on American women by the Expatriation Act, and "to place her
upon an equality with American men" with respect to American
citizenship.427
The Cable Act's connection to the Nineteenth Amendment arguably
bolstered the minority's implicit defense of congressional authority to
erase the historical record. 428 But as a statutory-interpretation lesson, this
point was misplaced. The Cable Act's relevant provisions were not
susceptible of more- and less-liberal interpretations. They could properly
be interpreted only to constitute Owen a perpetual, unbroken American
citizen. Whether Congress possessed the authority to command such an
interpretation is an entirely separate (and prior) constitutional question.
So although the Committee agreed on virtually nothing else, it rallied
around the "unanimous conclusion" that Owen was eligible to sit in the
House of Representatives. 429 It urged the House to adopt two resolutions:
Resolved, That William C. Lawson was not elected a
Representative to the Seventy-first Congress from the fourth
congressional district of the State of Florida and is not entitled to
a seat therein.
Resolved, That Ruth Bryan Owen was duly elected a
Representative to the Seventy-first Congress from the fourth
congressional district of the State of Florida and is entitled to
retain her seat therein.430
Though the majority would have seated Owen on constitutional grounds
alone, it felt obligated to "amplify the report of the chairman" with a
stinging critique of the minority's approach to Section 4.431 In short, the
minority had misconstrued Section 4, and Congress could not
constitutionally restore lost American citizenship.
by which Owen could recover her citizenship. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The theoretical dispute
over Section 4 concerned substance, not procedure. The minority probably meant that if one Congress
could unmake Americans, a later Congress could reverse this decision by entirely eliminating the past,
present, and future legal effects of earlier marital expatriations. This inference isn't self-explanatory,
and the minority gave no further justification for it.
426. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 7.
427. Id.
428. Like the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth, and
Twenty-sixth Amendments, the Nineteenth empowers Congress "to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. Perhaps the Sixty-seventh Congress thought it was "enforcing"
the Nineteenth Amendment when it purported to deny a past discriminatory law any continuing legal
effect.
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How to apply Section 4's key language, "After her naturalization she
shall have the same citizenship status as if her marriage had taken place
after the passage of this act"? The majority read the first "after" in
contradistinction to "before," so that the Cable Act "only establishes
[Owen's] citizenship status after the date of her naturalization"432-not
from 1910 to 1925. But this ignores Section 3's definition of what that
citizenship status would be. "After" Owen's naturalization, it would be as
if she had never ceased to be a U.S. citizen by reason of her marriage.
Sections 3 and 4 plainly purported to restore citizenship instead of just
conferring full American citizenship prospectively.43 3 The minority
invoked Section 7 as its coup de grace; that provision clarified that the
Expatriation Act's repeal "shall not restore citizenship lost." 434 But Owen
agreed that the repeal alone restored nothing; rather, naturalization
according to the Cable Act's terms eliminated prior disabilities.
The key question, then, was whether Congress could validly erase
periods of lost citizenship. The majority's addendum addressed this
fascinating issue, though without using familiar terminology of
constitutional power. The majority first decried the minority's
"inconsistency" in reading the Qualifications Clause strictly and the Cable
Act broadly.4 35 The minority "sets up a man of straw and then proceeds to
rough it with him." 4 36  Having read an "immediately preceding"
requirement into the Clause, they apparently found it "necessary to resort
to mental acrobatics to avoid what they have done" and award Owen her
seat. 437 But bulk obliteration of non-citizenship periods is a "legal fiction
[that] may not be indulged.... It would make untrue an obvious, evident,
and known fact"-that Owen was a British subject for fifteen years,
applied for naturalization as a British subject, and renounced her very real
political allegiance to George V.4 38
Whether liquidation of once-true legal facts is per se unconstitutional,
the majority didn't clarify. But it left no doubt that it was "giv[ing]
consideration to the constitutionality of the Cable Act." 439 And it found
two fatal infirmities. First, adopting the minority's interpretation of the
432. Id. at 8.
433. The majority's interpretation can be correct only if expatriated women would otherwise have
been something less than full citizens after becoming naturalized under the Cable Act. If not, it would
have been redundant to prescribe their assumption of ordinary citizenship status in Section 3. But it
has never been true that some naturalized American citizens enjoy a lesser citizenship status than
others. And Section l's codification of gender equality in the privilege of naturalization belies any
conception of women as lesser naturalized citizens.
434. Id.
435. Id
436. Id. at 9.
437. Id.
438. Id at 8.
439. Specifically, to Section 4. See id. at 9 ("We must face that responsibility. We assumed such
duty in full measure when, as individuals, we subscribed to the oath of office, the chief and central
obligation of which requires us to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.").
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Cable Act would permit the Senate and President to usurp the House's
exclusive right to judge its members' qualifications, since those
institutions also played a role in enacting the absurdity."o By this logic,
any law that regulated qualification-related facts-the simplest
naturalization or voluntary-expatriation law-would be automatically
unconstitutional as an arrogation of the House's exclusive prerogative to
judge its members' qualifications. That argument proves too much, since
Article I, Section 8 empowers our bicameral Congress to "establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.""i
Second, if Congress could lawfully annul Owen's expatriation period, it
could easily evade other constitutional requirements. Authority to pass an
alienage-erasing Section 4 also entailed the power to proclaim that "an
alien shall, after his naturalization, have the status and enjoy the privileges
of a natural born citizen," qualifying him to serve as president." 2 By the
minority's logic, Congress could even pronounce aliens eligible to serve in
the House of Representatives "immediately after [their]
naturalization[s]"!44 3  But both points missed a plausible limiting
principle," and the latter was self-defeating. If it would be unthinkable
for new naturalized citizens to serve in Congress, surely aliens cannot
legislate for the political community. Yet the majority's "cumulative"
interpretation would permit exactly that. Perhaps the Committee would
have coalesced around the minority's "immediately preceding" approach
if the majority had fully grasped the consequences of its commendable
(but likely misplaced) no-secret-intent philosophy." Instead, the
Committee fractured bitterly, supplying Congress with a rare opportunity
to engage in direct and unreviewable-if substantively perplexing-
constitutional lawmaking.
440. Id.
441. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Chairman Beedy, for one, refused to conclude "that in
recognizing the binding force and effect of our naturalization laws the House has surrendered its
constitutional right to be the sole judge of the qualifications of its Members." 72 CONG. REC. 10195
(1930) (statement of Rep. Beedy). The better objection to Section 4's unusual restorative provision
would be that one House cannot obligate its successors-"each House"-to disregard qualification-
related historical facts, even conceding Congress's general authority over naturalization and
expatriation procedures.
442. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 9.
443. Id.
444. Here is one possibility: Congress may not retroactively change individuals' citizenship
records, except to restore citizenship lost during nonelective expatriation periods. Such periods could
not arise today, since the Supreme Court held in Afroyin v. Rusk that Congress may not expatriate
American citizens unless they "voluntarily relinquish[] that citizenship." 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
445. The majority explained itself as follows: "The framers of the Constitution sought to avoid
language or phraseology which is complex and shunned any hidden meaning. They employed
language which is clear, simple, and easy of understanding. The ordinary rules of construction are
natural. They forbid the adding of any intent not reasonably within the meaning of the language."
Owen Report, supra note 234, at 10.
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6. The House Seats Owen (June 6, 1930)
From reading newspaper headlines, one would never have known that
Owen faced one final obstacle after her Elections Committee triumph.
"House Elections Committee Ends Contest of Florida Republican," blared
the New York Times.446 "Mrs. Owen Wins in House Fight To Retain
Seat."" 7 "Mrs. Owen's Victory."" 8 "Ruth Bryan Owen Wins Congress
Seat."44 9 "Mrs. Owen Wins." 45 0 What a marvelous moment for American
women-that sordid expatriation law would never again be invoked to
impugn their Americanness.
Except that Report No. 968 was just a proposal; only the full House
could dispose of Lawson v. Owen. It did just that on June 6, 1930, nearly
two years after Owen's election. The Clerk read the Committee's two
resolutions, bundled together as House Resolution 241.451 The House
unanimously adopted this analytically empty measure by voice vote,
without the least hint of prior discussion or dissent (save a prepared speech
by Chairman Beedy).452 The House merely "agreed to" the Committee's
bottom-line determination that Owen was "duly elected" and "entitled to
retain her seat." 453 Owen's colleagues had witnessed her fourteen-month
clinic on how to be a good congressman; they positively adored her.454
Rejecting the Committee's recommendation would have effectively
expelled her from Congress, creating a nationwide sensation. So although
the House's new provisional-seating rule455 guaranteed Florida a full
complement of congressmen, it likely multiplied Lawson's burden of
persuasion in this made-for-media constitutional challenge.
The Elections Committee must have known that this outcome was
inevitable. But three of its members troubled themselves to deliver lengthy
lectures on the deeper principles involved. Chairman Beedy went first,
right before the House voted. After covering much familiar ground, he
firmly insisted that Congress may lawfully regulate the status of its own
citizens, even to "bridge a gap" in someone's citizenship record.456
446. Vote To Seat, supra note 391.
447. Wins in House Fight, supra note 265.
448. Mrs. Owen's Victory, supra note 393.
449. Ruth Bryan Owen Wins Congress Seat, ATL. CONST., Mar. 23, 1930, at 6A.
450. Mrs. Owen Wins, supra note 392.
451. 72 CONG. REC. 10193 (1930).
452. Id. at 10196. Owen missed the denouement-she was still in Florida, celebrating her recent
renomination. Mrs. Owen Wins Right to Seat, SARASOTA HER.-TRIB., June 6, 1930, at 1.
453. 72 CONG. REC. 10193, 10196 (1930) (emphasis added). In a speech written before (but
delivered after) the full-House vote, Congressman Eslick ten times called Owen the "sitting Member."
Id. at 10198-99, 10202.
454. See Section III.B.3 supra. As one editor mused, "To find not one person in a republican
house to vote for a republican against a democrat is quite some compliment to the democrat." KEY
WEST CITIZEN, June 9, 1930, at 2.
455. See supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
456. 72 CONG. REC. 10195 (1930) (statement of Rep. Beedy).
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Legislating "in contravention of existing fact"457 was nothing new. In
1867, for example, Congress declared that enlistees who had deserted the
Army and Navy after April 19, 1865, should be legally regarded as never
having done so. 458 That law was "but one of many of a similar nature,"
and "no one has ever been heard to question its constitutionality."4 59
Section 4 of the Cable Act was therefore plainly constitutional; properly
interpreted, it made Owen whole.
Congressman Newhall expanded on the majority's position in a speech
given after the House formally seated Owen. He quoted Chief Justice
Marshall's Dartmouth College v. Woodward 60 opinion to demonstrate the
impropriety of reframing the Framers' charter to accommodate unforeseen
conditions. "The case being within the words of the rule," Marshall had
written, it "must be within its operation likewise, unless there be
something in the literal construction, so obviously absurd or mischievous,
or repugnant to the general spirit of the instrument," to warrant making an
exception.4 6 ' The "words of the rule" called for seven years, not seven
immediately prior years. As Newhall read the Convention debates, this
provision was meant to ensure that Representatives possessed "a
background of Americanism." 4 62 Owen epitomized these qualities, so
there was nothing "obviously absurd" about the majority's application.
Case closed.
Congressman Eslick of the minority responded with a pragmatic case
for the "immediately preceding" position. Change had come "thick and
fast" in recent years, both in public opinion and in the challenges
congressmen confronted.463 Deep knowledge of the Fathers' governmental
machinery just wasn't enough. Today's lawmakers "must know the
thoughts, the desires, and the heartbeat of the present age-not a decade or
decades ago."464 According to the majority, anyone born and raised in
America would be eternally eligible to the House after turning seven.465
Some scoundrel might junk his Americanism for the seductive "doctrine
of the reds."466 When the apostles of Bolshevism came knocking, Eslick
warned, "this case will be a precedent." 467 Cornered congressmen might
457. Id.
458. An Act for the Relief of Certain Soldiers and Sailors Therein Designated, ch. 28, § 1, 15
Stat. 14 (1867). This statute also eliminated a soldier or sailor's disabilities previously "incurred by the
loss of his citizenship in consequence of his desertion." Id.
459. 72 CONG. REc. 10195 (1930) (statement of Rep. Beedy).
460. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
461. Id. at 644-45 (quoted (imperfectly) in 72 CONG. REC. 10196 (1930) (statement of Rep.
Newhall)).
462. 72 CONG. REc. 10197 (1930) (statement of Rep. Newhall).
463. Id. at 10199 (statement of Rep. Eslick).
464. Id.
465. See id. (hypothesizing a candidate who lived his first seven years in America, left the
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then concoct some other exclusionary pretext, but the House would not be
able to deny admission to these ideological pestilences on citizenship
grounds. The precedent "the majority has written in this case . . . will later
rise to plague the House."468
But what legal principle did Lawson v. Owen stand for? The entire 435-
person House of Representatives, not any supporting committee, is
authorized to judge Members' qualifications. Five congressmen thought
citizenship periods could be cumulative; four disagreed. 4 69 The other 426
members (98 percent) left no trace of where (if anywhere) they stood,
because the House imputed none of the Committee's constitutional
reasoning to itself. It merely certified that Owen was "duly elected" and
"entitled" to sit.47 0 When endorsing or rejecting Elections Committee
resolutions in disputed-citizenship cases commits either chamber to a clear
legal position, up-or-down votes have determinable precedential
content.47 1 But there were many ways to defend Owen's eligibility. 472 By
declining to choose among them, the House afforded later generations
creative room to characterize the legal lessons of its barebones disposition.
IV. WAS LAWSON V. OWEN UNPRECEDENTED?
Lawson's legal team discovered only one previous citizenship contest,
and it availed nothing.473 "There is no precedent in either House of
Congress," Lawson averred in his written brief.474 As far as anyone knew,
this was correct. "The case is one for which there is no precedent,"
Congressman Newhall declared after the contest had ended.47 5
Congressman Eslick, who interpreted the seven-year clause differently, at
least agreed that neither chamber had ever considered the question: "I
have been unable to find, and so far as I know, there is not a precedent
throwing real light upon the issues involved in this contest. It is a new
468. Id
469. Id. at 10198.
470. Id. at 10193, 10196.
471. For example, West Virginians elected Rush Holt to the Senate in November 1934, fully
seven months before his thirtieth birthday. He stalled and presented his credentials after turning thirty.
A Senate committee concluded that the "date on which a Senator-elect presents himself to the Senate,
is sworn, and takes his seat, should be determinative of the age qualifications under the Constitution."
RICHARD D. HUPMAN, SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES FROM 1789 TO 1960, at
135 (1962). The full Senate declared Holt eligible. JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW:
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
180 (2007). In doing so, it necessarily adopted the committee's construction of the Qualifications
Clause's age provision, since Holt was eligible to serve only if the above-quoted statement is true.
472. See Section I.E supra.
473. Bainum told the Elections Committee, "There is one application that has been made of this
limitation provision"-the Senate's exclusion of James Shields in 1849. The Irish-born Shields had
unquestionably not been a citizen for nine years when he presented himself for admission. Owen
Hearing, supra note 11, at 34. Bainum also missed the Senate's exclusion of Albert Gallatin in 1794.
See Salamanca & Keller, supra note 23, at 278-83.
474. Lawson Brief supra note 231, at 15.
475. 72 CONG. REC. 10196 (1930) (statement of Rep. Newhall).
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question."476
If they were searching for a written report in which a House or Senate
committee had endorsed either the "cumulative" or "immediately
preceding" view, they wouldn't have found one. But this battle had been
fought twice before-in 1845, when congressmen debated whether recent
citizens of the Republic of Texas would be constitutionally eligible to
serve in Congress; and in 1870, when senators sparred over whether to
accord Dred Scott-now a constitutional laughingstock-any additive
weight in calculating Hiram Revels's technical fitness for office. These
deliberations offered alluring legalistic arguments in support of each
contestant's position. But the Revels episode in particular illustrated why
Lawson v. Owen ought to have been no riddle at all.
A. The Annexation of Texas: Hidden in Plain Sight
On December 29, 1845, the House and Senate jointly resolved that the
Republic of Texas "shall be one . .. of the United States of America, and
admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states."477
Equal footing meant full representation in Congress. Would the State of
Texas, never having been the Texas Territory, be able to elect a
constitutionally eligible delegation right away? That depended on how one
read the Qualifications Clauses. Texas had very recently been "a sovereign
nation, independent of us, owing us no allegiance, and governed by her
own laws."478 Most of its political stars had accumulated plenty of
American-citizenship credit, but they had sworn mandatory oaths of
allegiance to Mexico after migrating southward.479 For the first time in
American history, the problem of inconsecutive citizenship periods
bedeviled conventional thinking about a concrete, numerical constitutional
provision.
Opponents of slavery heaved every imaginable prudential and
constitutional protest at annexationists. Early in the debates, Congressman
John P. Kennedy crafted an elegantly deductive objection: if Texas were
immediately admitted as a state, no one could represent it in Congress,
since the Qualifications Clauses require seven and nine years'
citizenship.480 But this would create the anomaly of a state "bound to obey
all our laws, yet having no voice in the making of them." 481 Kennedy's
line of argument assumed that only seven or nine immediately preceding
years of citizenship satisfy the constitutional requirement. Congressman
476. Id. at 10198 (statement of Rep. Eslick).
477. Joint Resolution for the Admission of the State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th
Cong., 1st Sess., 9 Stat. 108 (1845).
478. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1845) (statement of Rep. Huntington).
479. RICHARD KLUGER, SEIZING DESTINY: THE RELENTLESS EXPANSION OF AMERICAN
TERRITORY 358 (2007).
480. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1845) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
481. Id. app. at 298.
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Garrett Davis made this assumption explicit, panning the "cumulative"
view as a "quibble unworthy of a county court lawyer."4 82
At least two congressmen disagreed, arguing that Texan transplants
were fully qualified under the Constitution as long as they had been
American citizens past their seventh and ninth birthdays.4 83 Yet most
annexationist responses implicitly conceded the "immediately preceding"
interpretation's correctness-and not just for the sake of argument. For
example, several annexationists claimed that Texas could simply elect
candidates who had been U.S. citizens (citizens of other states) at the
precise moment of annexation.4 84 But if this "borrowing" theory were a
sufficient answer, retorted annexation's opponents, why did Congress
admit Louisiana to statehood nine years to the day after the cession treaty
had been signed in 1803?485
Some friends of annexation maintained that the phrase "Citizen of the
United States" refers to a citizen of any state presently within the Union.486
Therefore, the entire time that American emigrants had been citizens of
the Republic of Texas could count toward their congressional eligibility.487
Some in the pro-annexation bloc even contended that Americans who had
taken up allegiance to the Republic of Texas hadn't actually expatriated
themselves; they had just "placed themselves beyond the operation of our
laws."488  Upon annexation, their American citizenship-merely
suspended-would reactivate, just as if they had never left the country.489
Much like Section 4 of the Cable Act, these outlier arguments permitted
congressmen to avoid the Qualifications Clause problem altogether if they
wanted to. Such theories thus threatened to distort the precedential signal
of Congress's decision to seat, or exclude, Texas's first senators and
representatives.
Congress chose the former path. Texas sent two senators to Washington
482. Id at 340 (statement of Rep. Davis).
483. See id. app. at 109 (statement of Rep. Tibbats) ("[T]he constitution did not require that the
citizenship should be immediately preceding the choice or election of senators and representatives;
and there was no rule of construction by which the gentleman would be authorized to interpolate such
words in the constitution."); id. app. at 306 (statement of Rep. Dromgoole) ("[I]n reference to the
inhabitants of Texas, it is notorious that they have emigrated from the United States, and most of them
have been seven and nine years citizens of the United States. The objection would not apply to any one
who had been the seven or nine years a citizen of the United States; and, at the time of election, an
inhabitant of Texas.").
484. Id at 177 (statement of Rep. Cobb); id. app. at 109 (statement of Rep. Tibbatts); id. app. at
145 (statement of Rep. Rhett); id. app. at 409 (statement of Sen. Henderson).
485. Id at 137 (statement of Rep. Davis); id app. at 298 (statement of Rep. Kennedy); id. app. at
350 (statement of Rep. Barnard).
486. Id. at 190 (statement of Rep. Stephens); id app. at 291 (statement of Rep. Daniel); id app. at
306 (statement of Rep. Dromgoole).
487. Earl Maltz, The Constitution and the Annexation of Texas, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 381, 390
(2006).
488. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1845) (statement of Rep. Dromgoole); see also id
app. at 291 (statement of Rep. Daniel) (articulating a presumption against self-expatriation).
489. Id. at 177 (statement of Rep. Cobb); id at 187 (statement of Rep. Dromgoole).
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by December 1846490 and four representatives by December 185 1.491 Each
of these six had helped govern a foreign country fewer than seven or nine
49249years ago, yet Congress seated them all.493 The House and Senate
probably appreciated the constitutional principles at stake, given how
thoroughly they had debated the matter.494 Texas's annexation therefore
weighs strongly in favor of the "cumulative" theory of the Qualifications
Clauses' citizenship requirements, as do the explicit (if infrequent)
assertions that American-born Texan colonists were all qualified to serve
by virtue of seven and nine earlier years of citizenship.495 But the
"cumulative" theory suffered explicit denunciation,496 and annexationists
rarely invoked it as a justification for seating Texans in Congress (if they
addressed the eligibility issue at all). And if some congressmen actually
believed that Texan settlers hadn't lost their American citizenship by
swearing allegiance to a foreign country or had always been U.S. citizens
inasmuch as Texas was now a state, seating them was entirely consistent
with the "immediately preceding" theory.
But everyone missed these points in 1929-30. The annexation of Texas
was entirely absent from the parties' written briefs and oral presentations,
Elections Committee members' questioning, the Committee's written
report, and public discussion of Lawson v. Owen. That the Committee's
(and the competitors') "considerable study"497 yielded no trace of this
monumental legislative exchange suggests that congressional
constitutional interpretation was vastly understudied in the early twentieth
century. Unfortunately, the Elections Committee also overlooked the
historic 1870 Senate debate concerning Hiram Revels's eligibility. It
might have taught them everything they needed to know.
490. Thomas Jefferson Rusk served from 1846-57, and Sam Houston from 1846-59. BEN R.
GUTTERY, REPRESENTING TEXAS: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF U.S. AND CONFEDERATE
SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM TEXAS 167 (2007).
491. Timothy Pilsbury served from 1846-49, David Kaufman from 1846-51, Volney Howard
from 1849-53, and Richardson Scury from 1851-53. HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, 2 HISTORY OF THE
NORTH MEXICAN STATES AND TEXAS, 1801-1889, at 449 (1889).
492. See id. at 84 (Houston and Howard); id at 93 (Kaufman); id at 122 (Pilsbury); id at 131
(Rusk); id at 136 (Scurry).
493. 1 have been unable to locate the precise moment of Congressman Howard's swearing-in in
the Congressional Globe, but no one uttered a peep about constitutional qualifications when Kaufman,
Scurry, Rusk, Pilsbury, and Houston were seated. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1846)
(Rusk); id. at 566 (Houston); id at 897 (Kaufman); id at 952 (Pilsbury); CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 5 (1851) (Scurry).
494. See Maltz, supra note 487, at 399 ("The depth and sophistication of the constitutional
analysis was often extremely impressive.").
495. See supra note 483 and accompanying text.
496. See supra note 482 and accompanying text. Congressman Joshua Giddings decried the
seating of Texas's Members as a naked constitutional violation. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. at 828 (1846) (statement of Rep. Giddings) ("Here are members now present who, six
months since, were citizens of a foreign nation-sworn to support a foreign Government.").
497. No Decision Reached in Mrs. Owen 's Case, supra note 386.
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B. Echoes ofRevels: The Expatriation Act as Dred Scott
On January 20, 1870, the Mississippi legislature elected Hiram Revels
to the U.S. Senate as a Republican. 49 8 Revels was black, the first nonwhite
congressman-elect in U.S. history.4 99 Democrats objected to his seating as
soon as Senator Henry Wilson presented Revels's credentials.50 The
incident quickly escalated into a controversy over Revels's constitutional
eligibility. In 1857, Dred Scott-the "adjudicated law of the land" 5 0 t-had
held that blacks could never be U.S. citizens.50 2 The Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified only in 1868.503 On one view, it didn't purport to
confer citizenship retroactively, instead declaring that "[a]ll persons born
or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States."
Republicans must have understood Dred Scott to have been authoritative
until then, or else the Fourteenth Amendment and the cognate Civil Rights
Act of 1866 were redundant-a "ridiculosity," a "preposterosity."505 The
date was now February 23, 1870. Republicans should acknowledge that a
court wouldn't-couldn't-have declared Revels a U.S. citizen when
General Lee surrendered his troops. Due regard for constitutional scruples
meant tough luck for Revels.
There was an easy way out, one with tremendous facial appeal. To put it
mildly, Republicans believed that Dred Scott departed from the correct
understanding of national citizenship to inflict previously nonexistent
disabilities on African-Americans. Under this theory, the free-born Revels
had been a citizen for the first thirty-five years of his life.so' Why not
claim that Revels had "been nine Years a Citizen" because he was once a
citizen for thirty-five? But not a single Republican senator argued from
"cumulative" premises.50 To be sure, Republicans "wanted the admission
of Revels to stand for a set of larger principles"sos-specifically, that it
"overrul[ed] the Dred Scott decision squarely."50 9 But surely a group that
generated a gloriously prosaic argument about fractional blood quanta 1 o
498. MATTHEW WASNIEWSKl, BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, 1870-2007, at 56 (2012).
499. Id. at 54.
500. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1503 (1870).
501. Id. at 1557 (statement of Sen. Vickers).
502. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 50 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
503. Primus, supra note 19, at 1682.
504. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. After all, "all laws are prospective unless by explicit words they
are made retroactive." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1558 (1870) (statement of Sen. Vickers).
505. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1560 (1870) (statement of Sen. Vickers). In all lexical
fairness, Vickers was quoting Republican Senators Charles Sumner and Carl Schurz, respectively.
506. Primus, supra note 19, at 1705.
507. Id. at 1704-05.
508. Id. at 1698.
509. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1543 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
510. The plea in abatement in Dred Scott had stated that Scott was "of pure African blood." Id.
(statement of Sen. Williams). At a glance, it sure seemed that Revels was "a person with a large
preponderance of white blood in his veins." Id. The applicable legal decisions, as Senator Williams
read them, held that "persons in whom the white blood preponderates are not persons of color" and so
have always been citizens. Id.
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would have pushed for Revels's eligibility under the clear text of the
Qualifications Clause if any of them had bought the "cumulative"
argument. Their silence, I believe, counts as weighty evidence that a
Senate majority rejected Owen's interpretation of the Clause in 1870. If
only Lawson had known.
But almost all Republicans simply refused to play the numbers game.
These Senators sat in judgment of Dred Scott, not Revels's eligibility.
Taney's vile verdict had "sunk into oblivion ... into eternal derision and
contempt.""" This "outrage upon the Constitution" had been "repealed by
the mightiest uprising which the world has ever witnessed."5 12 "Bom a
putrid corpse," Dred Scott "became at once a stench in the nostrils . . . to
be remembered only as a warning and a shame."513 And yet Democrats
coolly cited it to exclude Revels, profaning the Declaration's solemn ode
to human equality! 514
Republican after Republican vowed "never again to hear [Dred Scott]
quoted as an authority."5 " This entailed consciously denying Taney's
"reign of wrong" any continuing validity in qualifications mathematics.51 6
Instead, Republicans would reason from the enlightened integers of
Reconstruction's "reign of right and righteousness."' Senator James Nye
preferred to consult "the brighter and more attractive page of modem
progress" than the "cruelties and enormities" of the Taney era.' "[I]n this
blaze of light and constitutional reform," no court could formally
acknowledge the old regime's parchment iniquities.5 19 Tone-deaf
Democrats failed to appreciate "the music of the hour." 520
Senator Jacob Howard, an architect of the Fourteenth Amendment,
stripped the subject of any nonsense: "Shall we stand by our own
legislation .. . or shall we adopt the principles of the Dred Scott
decision?"5 21 Instead of ennobling "those barbarizing enactments of other
times," Senator Wilson savored "the living present and the advancing
future."5 22  Senator Frederick Sawyer also sickened of "defunct
511. Id at 1542 (statement of Sen. Howard).
512. Id at 1513 (statement of Sen. Nye).
513. Id at 1566 (statement of Sen. Sumner); see also id. at 1513 (statement of Sen. Nye)
(claiming that the People had jettisoned Dred Scott "as the lion shakes the dew from his hair").
514. See id. at 1566 ("All men are created equal, says the great Declaration.... To-day we make
the Declaration a reality.") (statement of Sen. Sumner).
515. Id. at 1513 (statement of Sen. Nye).
516. Id
517. Id
518. Id; see id at 1514 ("Why hitch on to the stubbing-post of the past, and dwell where Taney
dwelt?").
519. Id.; see id (claiming that Dred Scott "is beyond the power of human skill to revive it .... It
is dead").
520. Id.
521. Id at 1543 (statement of Sen. Howard).
522. Id at 1561-62 (statement of Sen. Wilson); see id at 1566 (statement of Sen. Sumner)
(refusing to suffer any "backward step").
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dogmas." 523 How could oath-swearing senators "go back and reason upon
the principles of the Dred Scott decision"? 524 Democrats must have been
reading "the Constitution of nine years ago," not "the Constitution under
which we live this day. "525
Lawson v. Owen presented an eerily similar problem: a legal authority
the sovereign People had rendered unconstitutional,526 but that still
threatened to pollute post-reformation progress. Typically, "constitutional
rules are formally entrenched against ordinary means of legal change."527
But in an ironic inversion, the Expatriation Act-a product of ordinary
lawmaking-found itself entrenched against new, true constitutional
norms, since individual expatriations have constitutional implications that
normally dissipate only with time.5 28 In 1870, Republicans hacked Dred
Scott to pieces and chose to pretend that it had never disgraced the U.S.
Reports. By 1930, the Expatriation Act had also sunk into the unforgiving
anticanon of congressional constitutionalism. 529 Social movements seeking
women's equality had apparently changed the Constitution even more than
the Nineteenth Amendment's text indicated. Why entertain Lawson's
backward-looking challenge?
In 1930, not a single person-not even Owen-suggested that the
Expatriation Act could be wholly ignored. Everyone "[went] into that
recondite inquiry as to the political status of' marital expatriates under the
1907 law. 530 After all, the very chamber deciding Owen's case had passed
the Expatriation Act by a nearly nine-to-one margin.531  The Supreme
Court had overwhelmingly upheld the law's constitutionality within recent
memory.532 Universal female suffrage was a monumental achievement, of
course, but it was hardly their grandfathers' blood-soaked battle for the
soul of America.
Still, Cable Act supporters interpreted the Nineteenth Amendment to
require "equal rights with reference to citizenship."533 Never again would
523. Id at 1564 (statement of Sen. Sawyer); see id (arguing that Americans had "had enough of
this sort of thing" after the illuminating "fires of war of revolution").
524. Id; see id. ("It is too late to talk about the Dred Scott decision.").
525. Id. (statement of Sen. Drake).
526. See, e.g., infra note 582 and accompanying text.
527. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1813, 1819 (2012).
528. Again, I assume the correctness of the "immediately preceding" view. The above scenario
represents an unfortunate example of what Professor Sachs calls "constitutional backdrops"-
nonconstitutional law insulated from ordinary methods of legal change. See generally Sachs, supra
note 527.
529. See Section V.A infra.
530. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1542 (1870) (statement of Sen. Howard) (refusing to
reason from antebellum assumptions in pondering Revels's eligibility).
531. 41 CONG. REC. 1467 (1907). The relevant bill had been "unanimously reported from the
Committee on Foreign Affairs at the request of the Department of State." Id. at 1464 (statement of
Rep. Perkins).
532. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915). Mackenzie was unanimous on the merits;
Justice McReynolds penned an enigmatic one-sentence dissent asserting that the Court lacked
jurisdiction. Id. at 312 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
533. 62 CONG. REC. 9046 (1922) (statement of Rep. Cable).
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"[p]articipation in our Government" be regulated "solely by a marriage
ceremony." 534 Like Dred Scott, the Expatriation Act was now "as archaic
as the doctrine of ordeal by fire,"535 meaning that Mackenzie v. Hare could
no longer withstand scrutiny.536 Wouldn't the House betray the principles
of 1920 by giving continuing effect to the principles of 1907?537 Why
dignify the "defunct dogmas" 538 of an extinct patriarchy? Perhaps Owen's
Congress saw no other principled option. I've uncovered no evidence that
anyone, until now, has connected the Revels and Owen episodes in this
way, so the Elections Committee likely had no conception of refusing to
grandfather the lingering effects of a now-unconstitutional legal authority.
As charmingly esoteric as Professor Primus's rediscovery of Revels might
seem at first blush, it held the key to answering one of the strangest riddles
a legislative body has ever faced.
V. WHAT CAN LA WSON V. OWEN TEACH US?
The next time an erstwhile expatriate seeks admission to Congress
fewer than seven or nine years after her naturalization, Owen's case will
be a trove of insights. (We shouldn't hold our breaths. 539) But more
importantly, close study of Lawson v. Owen unlocks new evidence that
can inform three of the debates most central to constitutional law and
theory.
A. The Nineteenth Amendment and Equal Protection
Today, the Supreme Court treats the Nineteenth Amendment as a
straightforward rule-no level of government may deny women, as
women, the right to vote. 540 An epochal shift in the foundations of
534. Id.
535. Id at 9058 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
536. See BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 75, at ix ("[T]he Nineteenth Amendment made a
continuation of the old principle impossible."). It would seem, then, that the Eleventh, Fourteenth,
Sixteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments are not the only ones to have overruled a Supreme Court
decision. For one expression of the conventional wisdom, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of
Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L.
REv. 1207, 1230 (1984) ("Constitutional amendments have overturned Supreme Court decisions on
only four occasions."). In fairness, the Nineteenth Amendment was not principally designed to disturb
a specific judicial precedent. But it did so just as effectively as the four listed above.
537. James Carson (Owen's lawyer) had argued as early as 1926 that the Nineteenth Amendment
expressed the People's policy as to Owen's very case: "If the house should enforce any other rule it
would be enforcing a law which has since been repealed on the ground of justice. It would be no less
absurd than for a court to convict in a criminal case a man for violating a statute which has been
repealed." Carson, supra note 149; see also Mrs. Owen's Victory, supra note 393 ("The effect of that
untenable arrangement under which an American woman became an Englishwoman through a
marriage contract should not be perpetuated, now that the measure has been supplanted.").
538. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1564 (1870) (statement of Sen. Sawyer).
539. See 72 CONG. REC. 10196 (1930) (statement of Rep. Newhall) ("[I]t is only remotely
possible that the decision in any future case will be based upon it as a precedent."); id. at 10198
(statement of Rep. Eslick) ("It is ... probably a question that may never arise again.").
540. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947, 953 (2002) (observing that the Amendment is now
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American governance seems to have left only this "systemically
unremarkable, normatively insignificant, fragment of constitutional
text."S4 1
It was not always so. Professor Reva Siegel has persuasively argued that
when Americans ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, they consciously
elevated women to equal-citizenship stature by repudiating an entire way
of thinking that had justified their disfranchisement.5 4 2 In Adkins v.
Children's Hospital54 3-decided just three years after the Amendment's
ratification-the Court invalidated a minimum-wage law on Fifth and
Nineteenth Amendment grounds for drawing distinctions on the basis of
sex. 5" Adkins has since been discredited for exalting the so-called "liberty
of contract," but modern distaste for that doctrine needn't negate an
entirely valid historical observation-that in 1923, the Supreme Court
"rea[d] the Nineteenth Amendment as conferring equality on women. . .
with significance for other bodies of constitutional doctrine."54 5
In an important article,5 46 Professor Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert
built on Siegel's synthetic approach to the Fourteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments in arguing that state-sanctioned sex discrimination became
unconstitutional after the latter was ratified. They claim that the Equal
Protection Clause's original public meaning forbids discrimination that
creates a system of caste,5 47 and that sex discrimination came to be seen as
a form of caste by 1920.548 Since an assurance of political rights
necessarily implies full civil rights,549 a constitutionally enfranchised
group may not be denied civil rights through reference to the very traits by
"interpreted as a nondiscrimination rule governing voting with no bearing on women's citizenship
outside the context of the franchise"); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Women's Exclusion from the
Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1715, 1722-23 ("[C]ourts settled relatively quickly on the
view that the Nineteenth Amendment was simply about women's suffrage."). As the second Justice
Harlan put it, "The Nineteenth Amendment merely gives the vote to women." Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 386 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
541. Siegel, supra note 540, at 1012; see also Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
399, 402 (1985) (grouping the Nineteenth in a list of amendments "that are rarely, if ever, taken to be
the stuff of constitutional adjudication or constitutional theory").
542. See generally Siegel, supra note 540.
543. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
544. Id at 553. The Court took judicial notice of the "great-not to say revolutionary-changes
which have taken place since [Muller v. Oregon (1908)] in the contractual, political, and civil status of
women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment." Id. It then cited the "present day trend ... by
which woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be given special
protection or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual and civil relationships." Id.
545. Siegel, supra note 540, at 1015; see also United States v. Hinson, 3 F.2d 200, 200 (S.D. Fla.
1925) (holding that "since the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment," the common-law doctrine of
coverture "has no application" as a matter of constitutional law); cf Hollander v. Abrams, 132 A. 224,
229 (N.J. Ch. 1926) ("[S]ince the Nineteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, practically all of
the disabilities of women, both married and single, have been removed [by legislation], so that to-day
she has practically all the rights and privileges of the male citizen.").
546. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 31.
547. Id. at 4.
548. Id. at 9.
549. See id. at 67 ("Political rights are the apex of the rights hierarchy with civil rights at the
base.").
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which voting rights are protected. 50 Therefore, "fidelity to the original
public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has, since 1920, led
inexorably to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits sex
discrimination."i5  Under this theory, the Nineteenth Amendment finished
the work of John Bingham and Jacob Howard, "mak[ing] women the
equals of men under the law." 5 2
I take no position on this conclusion's correctness or the methodology
employed to reach it. I wish only to note that, to the extent that the widely
shared understandings of Owen's generation may reflect actual
constitutional meaning, 553 Owen's struggle provides powerful evidence-
the most direct historical evidence yet discovered-that the Nineteenth
Amendment made women not just full and equal voters, but "the equals of
men under the law." 554 Justice Ginsburg's pathbreaking successes as a
litigator were not "the first time in United States history [when] it became
possible to urge successfully, before legislatures and courts, the equal-
citizenship stature of women and men as a fundamental constitutional
principle."5  Owen did just that-and to a Congress of men eager to
embrace it.
Two years after the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification, Congress
explicitly proscribed sex discrimination in the field of naturalization.556
Several congressmen championed the Cable Act as an inexorable
outgrowth of the Amendment's commitment to women's equal
citizenship.55' Far-flung print commentary on Lawson v. Owen suggests
that such legislative measures weren't simply products of political
550. Id at 85; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 465, 471 (1995) ("[The Nineteenth Amendment] can be understood as establishing a kind of a
fortiori argument: if women have equal political rights, a fortiori they should have equal civil
rights."). Eric Fish astutely notes that the Twenty-sixth Amendment sits uneasily with this "a fortiori"
theory of constitutional protection, but he proposes a "clarification theory" that justifies the former
theory's applicability to the Nineteenth. See generally Eric S. Fish, Response, Originalism, Sex
Discrimination, and Age Discrimination, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1 (2012). Section I of the Twenty-
sixth Amendment reads, "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
551. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 31, at 47.
552. Id. at 15. Professor David Strauss, for one, seems to deny the validity of this synthetic
approach in the sex-discrimination context: "[A] lot has happened since 1868. But as far as sex
discrimination is concerned, not a lot has happened to the Constitution. The Nineteenth Amendment
guaranteed women the right to vote, but that's all. No amendment was ever adopted to guarantee other
rights to women." DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 13 (2010).
553. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) (privileging "contemporaneous
exposition[s] of the constitution"); William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power,
122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811 (2013) ("[P]ost-ratification practice can frequently be indirect evidence of
Founding-era thought. It is reflected light, to be sure, but light nonetheless.").
554. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 31, at 15.
555. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Advice for Living, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/opinion/sunday/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-advice-for-living.html.
556. See Cable Act of 1922, ch. 411, § 1, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922) ("[T]he right of any woman to
become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of her sex or
because she is a married woman.").
557. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text.
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expediency. According to one newspaper, the Nineteenth Amendment
"put wom[e]n on an individual citizenship basis."55' "In these days of
equality of the sexes," another editorialist argued, Owen was right to argue
that "[s]auce for the goose is sauce for the gander." 559 A Washington Post
op-ed expressed the point as plainly as possible: the law invoked to
exclude Owen deprived her of equal citizenship rights, "in clear violation
of the nineteenth amendment." 560 "The only way that Congress could
make this amendment fully effective," the writer continued, would be "to
remove all disabilities on account of sex." 561 These understandings echoed
sweeping assertions about the Nineteenth Amendment that had appeared
in 1920s newspapers,562 such as that by Congressman Edward E. Browne:
"With the 19th amendment a part of our constitution it is an anomaly to
deny to voting citizens subordinate rights on account of sex."563 Calabresi
and Rickert's exact thesis, ninety years before.
Even Lawson joined the chorus. His written brief affirmed that the
Cable Act "was caused by the ratification of the XIX Amendment."'6
Accordingly, the Act "harmonized the rights of citizenship of an American
woman with an American man, placing them on an absolute equality."565
558. Objections to Seating, supra note 146.
559. Widow Fights, supra note 368.
560. Leonidas W. Ellis, Op-Ed., Says Ruth Bryan Owen Is Entitled to Seat in Congress Under
Nineteenth Amendment, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1930, at 6.
561. Id.
562. See, e.g., A Patriotic Obligation, EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER, Sept. 22, 1920, at 5 (claiming
that the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification "establish[ed] the full and equal citizenship of women");
J.C. Nagle, We Women of Today, THE EAGLE (Bryan, TX), Apr. 20, 1921, at 2 ("We women are equal
citizens now."); Wisconsin Where Women Are People, GULFPORT DAILY HER., Aug. 4, 1921, at 4
(arguing that the Nineteenth Amendment "intended to confer" "all the rights and privileges pertaining
to sex equality" (quoting a Richmond newspaper)); A Twentieth Amendment, APPLETON POST CRESC.,
Oct. 8, 1921, at 4 (declaring that equality in the "rights, duties, functions and obligations of citizenship
as between the two sexes are [sic] consequent upon the conferral of suffrage" (quoting a Lynchburg
newspaper)); Women and Equal Rights, SCRANTON REP., Mar. 9, 1922, at 8 ("Unquestionably it was
the intent of the nineteenth amendment to place women on a par with men as citizens."); Bowling
Green Man Enters as Dry Candidate?, SANDUSKY STAR JOURN. (OH), May 16, 1922, at 1, 13
(quoting a congressional candidate's pledge to support such "laws as are necessary to afford to women
full measure of the civil and political rights conferred by the nineteenth amendment" (emphasis
added)); Still Use Technicalities To Defeat Constitution, SAN BERNADINO CNTY. SUN, Dec. 28, 1925,
at 12 ("The purpose of the [Nineteenth Amendment] was to place women on an exact equality with
men in all matters of civil rights and citizenship."); id. (referring to the Nineteenth Amendment as "the
equal rights amendment"); Knighthood Flowers, LIMA NEWS, May 19, 1927, at 6 (concluding that, by
the Nineteenth Amendment, "Woman has gained her equality with man and as she stands in any court
of the land, she must be prepared to take its findings under the same laws and the same codes that mete
out justice to men").
563. WAUKESHA DAILY FREEMAN (WA), Mar. 9, 1922, at 4; see id ("[T]here certainly is no
excuse or justification at the present time with the Nineteenth amendment in force for denying women
the rights and privileges of men."). A League of Women Voters representative made this same point
immediately after Owen's victory in 1930: "Women as well as men are now voters and should be
entitled to all the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship as individuals without handicap by
reason of sex." Marie Elwell Onions, Club Women Plan World Campaign To Aid Suffrage, OAKLAND
TRIB., Mar. 16, 1930, at IS, 4S.
564. Lawson Brief supra note 231, at 7.
565. This statement wasn't entirely true, since the law contained lesser discriminations that
women's groups grudgingly accepted as the cost of legislative compromise. See BREDBENNER, supra
note 24, at 87 (describing this "gradualist approach to legal equality"). But the above quote provides
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Bainum reiterated this point at the Elections Committee hearing: the Cable
Act had "equalize[d] the man and woman so far as citizenship is
concerned," and "she stands before the law now as a man stands."5 66 "Had
it not been for the nineteenth amendment," Bainum surmised, Owen
would never have appeared before the Elections Committee to argue for
women's equal treatment.567 Lawson 's attorney believed and spoke these
things!
So did Owen. In fact, she framed Lawson's challenge as a referendum
on "the attitude of my Government toward its women citizens."5 68 A
generation before, Congress had confiscated her citizenship merely
"because [she] was a woman." 569 Lawson v. Owen was a blessing, really,
to the extent that it "ma[d]e more clear the laws which have dealt unjustly
with women."5 70 The House would soon author an enduring installment of
constitutional history: would it "establish the dignity and individuality" of
the American woman's citizenship by confirming "her right to the same
consideration at the hands of her Government as is enjoyed by the male
citizen"?5 71 Owen's characterization stuck. The Washington Post
considered her Elections Committee triumph "a victory for women who
are seeking to remove legal discriminations against their sex." 572
As did the Elections Committee itself. In Report No. 968, the minority
deliberately construed the Cable Act in light of its all-sufficient impetus,
the Nineteenth Amendment. Their task-the law's purpose-was "to right
an injustice," "to place [women] upon an equality with American men."573
As Chairman Beedy saw it, this recent flurry of higher and ordinary
lawmaking served "to place American-born women on the broad basis of
enjoying all the essential rights of American citizenship." 574 Beedy fully
embraced "the modern trend to give to the American woman the fullest
enjoyment of those rights which are incident to American citizenship
irrespective of sex."5 75 (So did his political party, in its 1928 platform:
"The Republican Party, which from the first has sought to bring this
development about, accepts whole-heartedly equality on the part of
women." 576)
For Congressman Newhall of the majority, the Nineteenth Amendment
insight into Lawson's understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment, and thus the bipartisan support a
more expansive reading of that Amendment once enjoyed.
566. Owen Hearing, supra note 11, at 32.
567. Id at 40.
568. Id at 61.
569. Id at 55.
570. Id at 59.
571. Id at 61.
572. Mrs. Owen's Victory, supra note 393.
573. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 7.
574. 72 CONG. REC. 10195 (1930) (statement of Rep. Beedy).
575. Id. at 10196.
576. Id. at 9317.
60 [Vol. 29:1
60
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol29/iss1/1
2017]
"made an equal citizenship status" for women.577 "There had been
discrimination against woman," but "now clothed in citizenship she
possesse[s] every right of man."17 ' The Expatriation Act had inflicted an
"archaic injustice"; 579 now, the Cable Act "makes woman man's equal." 80
The former's constitutionality had been "upheld on the basis of [a] legal
fiction."'8 1 But after the Nineteenth Amendment, the Expatriation Act
"would now be unconstitutional."582 This was no casual or cryptic remark
of an indifferent politician. It was the fully considered, crystal-clear legal
conclusion of a congressman who had pondered Owen's case for months,
and who cared enough about getting the constitutional reasoning right to
deliver a lengthy speech for the Congressional Record after the House
dismissed Lawson's challenge.
Remarkably, Lawson v. Owen overlapped with a League of Nations
conference that addressed member states' nationality laws. The American
delegates walked out in protest over the attendees' refusal to abolish
derivative citizenship for women.583 On May 21, 1930, two weeks before
Owen was formally seated, the House debated whether to pass a resolution
approving the delegates' actions. Not a single participant denied the
"absolute equality for both sexes in nationality to be our policy";584 dissent
emerged only over the wisdom of inserting the House into an
international-law imbroglio. Owen told her doleful tale to the very House
preparing to judge her qualifications."' Minutes later, Republican
Congressman Albert Johnson, reactionary in other respects, 8 remarked
that "each and every one of us here is firmly of the belief that every
woman in the United States should have every right that every man in the
United States has-it is our policy."5 87
In short, very soon after the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification, "the
same exposition" of women's constitutional equality "was explicitly
577. Id. at 10200 (statement of Rep. Newhall).
578. Id. at 10200-01.
579. Id. at 10196.
580. Id. at 10201.
581. Id. at 10196.
582. Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 10201 (observing that Mackenzie v. Hare "was before the
nineteenth amendment and the passage of the Cable Act. If this question were presented now and
under existing law, I think the judgment of the court would be the reverse"). One might instead
conclude that the Nineteenth Amendment rendered the Expatriation Act unconstitutional merely as to
new foreign marriages, because the Act had deprived certain women (Americans marrying foreigners)
of the right to vote on the basis of their sex. Clearly, Newhall took a far more sweeping view of the
Nineteenth Amendment.
583. Id. at 9317; see id ("[W]e believe in equality in nationality without distinction as to sex.")
(statement of Rep. Fish).
584. Id. (statement of Rep. Fish).
585. See id. ("Because of that recent experience of my own, the nationality laws of our country
are a matter of deep personal concern.") (statement of Rep. Owen).
586. Johnson was the most vocal nativist in a Congress that had passed unprecedented
immigration restrictions in the early 1920s. ROGER DANIELS & OTIS L. GRAHAM, DEBATING
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION, 1882-PRESENT, 20 (2001).
587. 72 CONG. REC. 9320 (1930) (statement of Rep. Albert Johnson).
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declared and admitted by the friends and by the opponents"'588 of Owen's
political party. Yet, Adkins aside, not until the 1970s did the Supreme
Court invoke equal-protection principles to invalidate laws discriminating
on the basis of sex.5 8 9 In 1994, Justice Ginsburg reflected on this doctrinal
path not taken, one marked so vividly by Owen's generation:
There was always a view that once the Nineteenth Amendment
was passed and it made women full citizens, that was in effect an
Equal Rights Amendment... . Many people thought you could
put the Fourteenth Amendment together with the Nineteenth
Amendment and that was essentially the Equal Rights
Amendment. But it didn't happen.5 90
Calabresi and Rickert argue that it should have, that "the Court has
missed the boat" on the Nineteenth Amendment.'9 The documentary
history of Lawson v. Owen furnishes significant new evidence for their
provocative counter-doctrinal claim. Owen's story also necessitates two
related inquiries: When did her generation's shared assumption of
women's constitutional equality begin to break down, receding into a
decades-long dormancy? And why, given the Court's frequent resort to
"constitutional history," 592 has modern sex-discrimination doctrine
developed so ahistorically? 593 It might have instead taken root in the post-
suffrage proposition that "every woman in the United States should have
every right that every man in the United States has."5 94
Lawson v. Owen was the epitome of what might have been. It shows
that constitutional change can be as transient as it is transformative when
citizen activism loses its steam. What Ruth Bryan Owen's victory might
have meant for equal-protection doctrine, and why she instead bequeathed
no lasting constitutional legacy, deserve serious scholarly examination.
B. "Seven Years ": Phantom Clarity and Lived Experience
In researching her own eligibility, Owen found "nothing
equivocal ... about the wording of the Constitution."5 95 The Elections
588. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 (1 Wheat.) U.S. 304, 351 (1816).
589. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
590. GRETCHEN RITTER, THE CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC
MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 46 (2006); see also Hasday, supra note
540, at 1722-23 ("The Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence did not develop as an interpretation of
the Nineteenth Amendment.").
591. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 31, at 96.
592. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2016).
593. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973) ("We might also note that, over the
past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications.")
(emphasis added).
594. 72 CONG. REC. 9320 (1930) (statement of Rep. Albert Johnson).
595. Owen Hearing, supra note I1, at 60.
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Committee majority also deemed the seven-year provision's "ordinary
meaning ... apparent on the face of the instrument."59 6 Who could fault
them? Hadn't Owen indisputably "been" seven years a citizen?
Almost all modem constitutional theorists agree that the Constitution
contains some hard-wired provisions that, by their nature, dictate easy
answers to legal disputes. Where the Framers consciously entrenched
"particularized, bright-line demarcations,"597 this wisdom holds, the
Constitution simply "means what it says and says what it means." 5 98  For
such "specific" provisions, "conscious reference to purpose seems
unnecessary." 599 It would simply be preposterous to allow "the principles
or purposes behind the text" to override an "unambiguous, concrete and
specific rule."60 Accordingly, generations of judicial60 1 and scholarly602
596. Owen Report, supra note 234, at 6.
597. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 363 (1981).
598. Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really
Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis ofPresidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237,
239 (1995).
599. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 13 (1980).
600. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 14 (2011).
601. See, e.g., Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2690
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution ... speaks in some places with elegant
specificity."); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (finding the relevant constitutional text to convey a "clear" meaning, regardless of historical
practice); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) (claiming that "explicit and unambiguous balances . .. are struck in various provisions
of the Constitution"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983) (finding certain constitutional clauses
"explicit and unambiguous" on their own terms); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]he language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain
evident meaning."); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Constitution's "arithmetic[al]" provisions are "explicit
and specific"); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(contrasting "very specific constitutional provisions" with "broad standards of fairness"); Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (describing some constitutional provisions as "so
particularized as not to admit of construction"); Lake Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889)
("[W]hen the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts ... are not at liberty to
search for meaning beyond the instrument."); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 302-03 (1827)
(explaining that a constitutional provision can be "unambiguous, and its meaning entirely free from
doubt").
602. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as
It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 263 (2005) ("Sometimes the original meaning of a text is clear
and rule-like . . . and it directly dictates the outcome of a case or controversy."); Bradley & Siegel,
supra note 36, at 1233 (characterizing as "taken for granted" in legal scholarship that the "rule-
oriented function of numbers in legal texts" entails a "bright-line approach to issues like candidate
qualifications"); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on
Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1455 (1997) ("[T]he
Constitution contains some fairly specific rules that do not change over time. . . . [L]itigation about
those parts of the Constitution is unthinkable, and thus never occurs."); Thomas B. Colby, The
Sacrifice ofthe New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 731 (2011) (summarizing the prevailing view that
"[w]hen the original meaning of a constitutional provision is narrow and rule-like, ... there can be
only one result that is consistent with original meaning"); Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional
Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321 n.15 ("The Constitution's numerical provisions are... extreme
instances of rule-like norms."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987) ("Where the text speaks clearly
and unambiguously . .. its plain meaning is dispositive."); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment
and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1708 (2004) ("[T]he everyday
meaning of some clauses will simply be clear and precise in context."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does
the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 881 (2009)
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authority proclaim that absolute constitutional clarity can be ascertained
from the face of the document itself. The same is often said of statutory
text.6 03
The House and Senate Qualifications Clauses speak in numbers, not
norms. Representatives and senators must have been citizens for "seven"
and "nine" years, respectively. These clauses appear in Professor
Frederick Schauer's list of "settled" and "[u]nlitigated" constitutional
provisions, 604 the ones that never "generate the important questions of
constitutional theory." 605 The seven-year figure was a somewhat-arbitrary
product of interest-balancing, but the fact that the Framers settled on a
hard number instead of a list of requisite traits is compelling evidence that
they sought to bind future Congresses "to respond in a determinate way to
the presence of delimiting triggering facts." 60 6 What could be complicated
about a congressional citizenship contest?
The unanticipated puzzle of lost birthright citizenship followed by
naturalization, leading to scattered citizenship periods, forced the Seventy-
first Congress to decide when a member-elect must have "been seven
Years a Citizen." One might deny the problem's existence, as Owen did,
by pointing to the clause's rule-like precision. But without probing the
citizenship requirement's basic purpose-and the "cumulative" view's
unthinkable implications-the provision's application to "new and
unforeseen phenomena" 607 strikes at the heart of Article I, Section 2. For if
the seven-year requirement is meant to accomplish anything, it forbids
aliens from serving in Congress.608 Yet the Elections Committee
majority-and Owen herself-unwittingly granted that the Constitution
("Sometimes the words state bright-line rules, like the thirty-five years of age requirement."); Richard
A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (claiming that interpretive
issues regarding the Constitution's "numerical provisions" are "beyond contestation"); James E. Ryan,
Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2011)
("[E]veryone agrees that the text, where specific, should control.").
603. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1119 (2016) ("[E]ven the most
formidable argument concerning the statute's purposes could not overcome the clarity we find in the
statute's text." (quoting Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012)); Mohamad v. Palestinian
Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012) (concluding that "a purposive argument simply cannot
overcome the force of the plain text"); BedRod Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)
("[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.").
604. Schauer, supra note 541, at 404.
605. Id. at 401; see id. at 418-19 ("We need not depart from the text to determine ... the age and
other qualifications for various federal offices."); Strauss, supra note 32, at 12 ("[Slome isues are so
conclusively settled by the text that they are never litigated.").
606. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (describing rule-like legal directives, as opposed to
standards, which "ten[d] to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation"); see also Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living
Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 103 (claiming that "[c]onstitutional adopters choose hardwired
rules because they want to limit discretion").
607. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 45 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).
608. For Supreme Court case law strongly supporting this position, see supra note 415.
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permits this inconceivable outcome.
It is not exactly news that the clarity-in-practice of seemingly precise
legal language can be shaped by extratextual considerations. District of
Columbia residents may avail themselves of federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction, even though Article III speaks of "Citizens of different
States." 609 The military would surely be forbidden to quarter troops in
someone's apartment or dormitory, as well as her "house." 610 It is widely
assumed that neither the Executive nor the judiciary, in addition to
"Congress," may abridge First Amendment guarantees. 61  And despite that
Amendment's iconic phrase "no law," the government may in fact silence
speakers if its restrictions are sufficiently tailored to achieve a valuable
enough state interest.612 As Professor Jamal Greene puts it, "The
susceptibility of semantic meaning to political and historical construction
may pose a serious challenge to the intelligibility of the rules-standards
distinction." 613
We as a legal culture have decided-at least sometimes-to allow
concerns extraneous to the constitutional text to trigger perceptions of
textual ambiguity. And as the Supreme Court has recently demonstrated in
three marquee statutory-interpretation decisions, this move "can be made
with respect to any text." 614 In Bond v. United States, for example, the
Court concluded that statutory ambiguity "derive[d] from the improbably
broad reach of the key statutory definition" and "the deeply serious
consequences of adopting such a boundless reading."6 15 Justice Scalia
ridiculed this departure from diagnosing clarity on the basis of text alone:
"Whatever has improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently
unnecessary consequences ... is ambiguous!"616 Yates v. United States
and King v. Burwell similarly allowed purposive and pragmatic
considerations to override initial perceptions of textual clarity. 617
This judge-empowering interpretive device has proven immensely
609. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 1; see Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582 (1949).
610. U.S. CONST. amend. III; see Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
611. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 36, at 1243-47.
612. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Even in the most speech-friendly doctrinal
circumstances, abridgments are permitted if they are "the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest." McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
613. Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term - Comment: The Supreme Court as a
Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124, 147 (2014).
614. Re, supra note 37, at418.
615. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2015) (emphasis added).
616. Id at 2096 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas
P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2109, 2150, 2152 (2015) ("The naked text could hardly have been clearer.... There does not seem to
be any textual ambiguity in the law.").
617. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (concluding that not all objects that are
tangible are encompassed within the statutory phrase "any . . . tangible object"); King v. Burwell, 135
S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (holding that the statutory phrase "an Exchange established by the State" included
exchanges established by the federal government).
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controversial," 8 for it threatens to distort the achievements of successful
political coalitions. Lawson v. Owen should compound this anxiety,
because it confirms that in some instances, purposive and pragmatic
considerations are necessary to determine whether a text is clear in the
first place. That long-overlooked episode shows that not even
"mathematical" provisions are immune-indeed, perhaps the Framers
used "breathtakingly exact" 619 language when they most overestimated
their own predictive abilities, causing them to dictate consequences at war
with uniformly shared objectives. This isn't to say that every numerical
constitutional provision must suddenly be thrown into chaos, or that all
exemplars of "constructed constraint"620 or "the New Holy Trinity" 621
were correctly decided. But unless the Qualifications Clauses allow aliens
to make Americans' laws for them, Owen's case shows why those
interpretive techniques cannot be flatly rejected.
C. Expatriation's Revenge? Containing Repudiated Constitutional
Principles
As news of Owen's Elections Committee victory broke, a Washington
Post editorial offered a lucid overview of the situation: Owen's challenger
had perversely sought to capitalize on the lingering legal implications of a
now-unconstitutional statute. In other words, "The effect of that untenable
arrangement under which an American woman became an Englishwoman
though a marriage contract should not be perpetuated, now that the
measure has been supplanted." 622
But in 2015, a Supreme Court plurality perpetuated the effect of that
very law-one that had divested only women of their American
citizenship upon taking a non-citizen spouse. Justice Scalia's opinion in
Kerry v. Din affirmatively cited the Expatriation Act of 1907 as part of our
long and "all-too-recent practice" of "regulating spousal immigration." 623
In denying that an American woman possessed a liberty interest in the
disposition of her foreign husband's visa application, Scalia observed that
women in the plaintiffs position had once "lost [their] own rights as a
citizen upon marriage."624 This was a "striking[]" 6 25 indication that the
618. See Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (denouncing the Court's "magic trick" in "interpret[ing] the constitutional
term 'the Legislature' to mean 'the people'); King, 135 S. Ct. at 1497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Secretary of Health and Human Services is not a State."); Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1092 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) ("Congress said what it meant and meant what it said."); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme
Court, 2013 Term - Comment: Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REv. 85, 89 (2014)
(claiming that the Bond Court "flound] ambiguity where none existed," for "[t]he statute's language
was crystalline").
619. Manning, supra note 38, at 1979.
620. See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 36.
621. See generally Re, supra note 37.
622. Mrs. Owen's Victory, supra note 393.
623. 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (plurality opinion).
624. Id. at 2135.
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asserted liberty interest was not "objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition," which the plurality took to be a
prerequisite for recognizing unenumerated fundamental rights under the
Due Process Clause. 626
Aside from the factual inaptness of this citation, 62 7 the Din plurality
thought it immaterial that women's marital expatriation was a primitive
practice now understood to offend elemental principles of inclusion in the
American constitutional order. If enacted today, the Expatriation Act
would be unconstitutional twice over. First of all, as even the Din plurality
acknowledged, women's derivative citizenship was a vestige of the
Blackstonian-era law of coverture. 628 To understate the case significantly,
"Modem equal-protection doctrine casts substantial doubt" on the male-
empowering legal unity of husband and wife. 629 And second, the Supreme
Court held in Afroyim v. Rusk that Congress may not "take away an
American citizen's citizenship without his assent." 630 Afroyim repudiated
the reasoning of Mackenzie v. Hare, which had legitimated the fiction that
a woman's marriage to a foreigner demonstrated conclusively that she
intended to renounce her citizenship.631 Yet the Din plurality accorded this
outmoded, long-repealed law continued force in present-day constitutional
adjudication.
In recent years, the proper methodology for identifying fundamental
constitutional rights has been as unstable as the Court's shifting coalitions.
The majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) insisted that this task
"requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment" in a way that is "guide[d]
and discipline[d]," but not wholly determined, by past practices.632 This
approach finds considerable support in the case law. 633 But Chief Justice
Roberts (in dissent) could also plausibly claim that "[o]ur precedents have
625. Id.
626. Id. at 2138 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
627. Section 3 of the Expatriation Act hardly regulated "spousal immigration" or women's
treatment "in the immigration context," id. at 2135-36-it simply specified the citizenship
consequences of taking a foreign husband, even if the marriage occurred domestically and husband
and wife continued to reside together in the United States. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 307
(1915) (finding that the Act imposed "no limitation of place" on marriage's expatriative effects).
628. See Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311 (remarking that "[t]he identity of husband and wife is an
ancient principle of our jurisprudence . .. giv[ing] dominance to the husband").
629. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2136 (plurality opinion).
630. 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967); see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980) ("[Tlhe trier
of fact must .. . conclude that the citizen not only voluntarily committed the expatriating act
prescribed in the statute, but also intended to relinquish his citizenship.").
631. See Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 312 (asserting that the Expatriation Act proposed "a condition [to
be] voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences").
632. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
633. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) ("[H]istory and tradition are . .. not
in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (explaining that this inquiry requires "reasoned judgment," for due
process's "boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (opining that liberty exists along "a rational continuum" that
must be curated with "reasonable and sensitive judgment").
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required that implied fundamental rights be 'objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."' 634 The latter approach-which the
Din plurality had embraced two weeks earlier-is designed to err on the
side of preserving space for democratic choice. After all, "guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended," 635 and the Court's exaltation of contested social and economic
theories has accounted for some of its gravest historical errors.636
But resurrecting flatly unconstitutional practices is entirely unnecessary
to maintaining an appropriately modest judicial role. Americans are not
"engaged in an earnest and profound debate"637 about whether to
involuntarily expatriate a portion of their law-abiding female citizenry.
That ruinous policy choice has been constitutionally off limits for many
decades. Forbidding constitutional actors to invoke such abhorrent
traditions in generating new doctrine would be one way to ensure that
"tradition is a living thing," and that due-process jurisprudence not
"build[] on" "traditions from which [the nation] broke." 638 But that narrow
rule of admissibility-which could exist entirely apart from the feared
subjectification of individual liberty-would not force judges to consider
whether the philosophical underpinnings of certain practices have become
obsolete, as Justice Brennan once advocated.639
The approach adopted by the Din plurality would truly "allow[] the past
alone to rule the present,"640 even if every member of the Supreme Court
agreed that the relevant "past" was now plainly unconstitutional. If forced
female expatriation is part of "this Nation's history and constitutional
traditions"641-and thus fair game for undercutting alleged liberty
interests-then it is entirely proper to argue that a claimed right cannot be
considered fundamental because American law once tolerated the slave
trade, poll taxes, racial segregation, and women's exclusion from the legal
profession. Practices that have been extirpated from our constitutional
tradition ought not weigh against a finding that others have firmly taken
root there. "[C]areful 'respect for the teachings of history' 642 requires at
least this much. Or as the Supreme Court recently remarked in dissociating
itself from past constitutional wrongs, "There is no grandfather clause that
634. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21
(1997)); see also, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (requiring that any asserted
liberty interest "be [one] traditionally protected by our society").
635. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
636. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616-17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
637. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
638. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
639. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (preferring "to ask whether the
basis for [a] rule . . . has changed too often or too recently to call the rule embodying that rationale a
'tradition"').
640. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
641. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added).
642. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids."643
In allowing a blatantly unconstitutional practice to shape modem due-
process doctrine, Justice Scalia's traditionalist Din opinion was itself quite
innovative-apparently the first of its kind. Din's law-generating
reanimation of revolting historical traditions should be rejected no less
forcefully than the practices themselves. And more broadly, adjudicators
of all stripes should never "giv[e] legal effect to the fact that other
principles-evil principles-[were] applied at an earlier time." 644
CONCLUSION
A surge of anti-prohibition sentiment swept Ruth Bryan Owen from
office in November 1932.645 But President Roosevelt deemed her
continued service indispensable. On April 12, 1933, he nominated Owen
to become America's Minister to Denmark and the nation's first female
ambassador. 646 The Senate unanimously confirmed her that same day
without the customary referral to the Foreign Affairs Committee.64 7 In the
ultimate tragicomic twist, Owen resigned the post under considerable
pressure after taking a Danish husband in 1936." Denmark hadn't yet
abolished women's derivative citizenship, so the American Minister to
Denmark found herself a subject of King Christian X!649
But Ruth Bryan Owen Rohde's native country knew better than to
abandon her again. Less than a week after this controversial marriage, the
Daughters of the American Revolution named her honorary chairman of
their Good Citizenship Pilgrimage, modeled after Owen's innovative
citizenship contests for schoolchildren. 65 0 Much later, the New York City
Federation of Women's Clubs honored Ruth for her "outstanding
contributions to good citizenship" and devotion to "the letter as well as the
spirit of our Constitution and the Bill of Rights."65 '
643. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016); see also id at 732 (clarifying that
states have no interest in "preserv[ing] a conviction or sentence that the Constitution deprives [them]
of power to impose").
644. Primus, supra note 19, at 1688; see also Entines v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214
(D.D.C. 2016) ("[T]he Court today gives no continuing legal effect to the racial classifications of an
earlier era."); cf Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 817, 848 (2015) ("Our law might require us to ignore what past law actually was, in favor of
what we now say it was. An honest positivist in mid-I 650s England would say that the monarchy had
been abolished; but when the Restoration came in 1660, the official position of English law was that
Charles II had been king for the last twelve years.").
645. Harris G. Sims, Mrs. Owen's Defeat Grieves Floridians, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1932, at E6.
646. WRIGHT, supra note 124, at 78. Having seen the actual nomination letter, I can report (sadly)
that it is marred by ink stains and pencil markings.
647. 77 CONG. REC. 1570 (1933).
648. Ruth Owen Quits Her Post as Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1936, at 1.
649. Chesly Manly, Find No Law To Bar Ruth Owen as U.S. Envoy, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., July 25,
1936, at 5.
650. Mrs. Rohde Named D.A.R. Group Head, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1936, at 12.
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Ruth Bryan Owen lived her life on the vanguard of social and
constitutional change. Her celebrated citizenship case made her the face of
gender equality in American law. But constitutional scholars have
overlooked Owen's struggles, and so for decades have missed crucial
evidence that might have helped provide a more historically faithful basis
for modern sex-discrimination doctrine. Likewise, this overlooked
eligibility contest proves that whether even the Constitution's numerical
clauses are "clear" may well depend on extrinsic considerations that
change continuously in light of freshly received facts. And the peculiar
nature of Owen's near-exclusion-an unconstitutional statute threatening
to overshadow the very principles that supplanted it-shows why practices
repugnant to the modern constitutional order should never be accorded
residual legal effect.
Revels and Owen illuminate two generations' efforts to make sense of
our deepest national values by transcending a darker, not-so-distant past.
Their gripping citizenship contests evoke long-forgotten-yet truly
fundamental-strands of our constitutional heritage. What other neglected
heroes have escaped our attention, and what will their stories tell us?
70 [Vol. 29:1
70
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol29/iss1/1
